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Jeff Chen
Author's Bio
John Lewis Gaddis is the history professor at the prestigious Yale University. He is at the forefront of containment policies of the United States during the Cold War. Many of his works, if not all, pertain to the cold war and have gained praise. He earned his degree under Robert Divine. Gaddis has been the recipient of numerous awards and the latest, the National Humanities Award in which he was able to meet the president 每 George W. Bush.
Gorbachev's Folly
The Cold War: A New History by John Lewis Gaddis is a newly written book by the Yale University professor of History. Having written many other books that have achieved high praise, Gaddis brings to the table "the most accessible distillation of that [cold war] yet written"1. The book doesn't focus on a specific topic of the Cold War but spans its entirety. While not as appealing as most books that teenagers read, this book is written in a more modern way than most historians tend to write. Because of this notion, the book gives wonderful insight upon the Cold War in more than one enjoyable and accessible way to the younger. Furthermore, the plethora of awards that have been awarded along with the raving reviews dictates the success of his book. Gaddis concludes his perspective on the Cold War and the factors that both contributed to its spark and dying flame to not only "Reagan's speech or Orwell's book [1984,]"2 but to the visions they saw, hopes they strove toward, and fears that leaders faced. It was the culmination of overt ambition that led to the spark of the Cold War.
Following the fall of the Nixon Administration due to Watergate, along with the failure of Detente, and the influence of Henry Kissinger, the government soon followed policies for universal acceptance. Even though Detente was implied to ease tensions of the Soviet Union, China, and US, the policy, stated by Kissinger, was to avoid being "excessively pragmatic."3 But because the intention of Detente was a far cry from its "avoidance of war and revolution,"4 the ideal of easing tensions between the cold war rivals was only achievable by the facade of universal justice. However, Détente's purpose was overshadowed by the separate ambitions of world leaders. Although rival nations strived for universal acceptance, their "legitimacy rested on an increasingly implausible ideology."5 As the Russian government failed to sustain itself with innate fear for internal reform, they relied heavily on the idea of diplomacy; when they looked towards diplomacy, they looked to its leader 每 America. Gaddis outline that Kissinger was careful 每somewhat reluctant--to become too involved with Cold War Diplomacy. Fortunately, the Helsinki conference was held, and to Kissinger's surprise, charted a potential breakthrough in diplomatic relations. The conclusion of the Helsinki conference 每attended by 33 states-- ended with Kissinger's statement that "rarely has a diplomatic process so illuminated the limitations of human foresight."6 Not only was the diplomatic relationship a outspoken success, Kissinger's views on associating with the Soviet Union dissipated. The Helsinki conference had held greater effects in the Soviet Union than most had expected. Furthermore, not only did this ease diplomatic strife in the Soviet Union, it solidified Russian territorial gains after the Second World War.
As Ford led America, the newly elected Pope John Paul II rose to power, and with it, began the onslaught that would eventually destroy communism throughout Europe. The head of the entire Christian population, the Pope's influence became the bane of communism as it began to fall apart slowly but surely. By destroying and "rattling the authorities throughout Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe, and even the Soviet Union. Others quickly followed his [The Pope] example."7 Consequently, the fall of communism gave birth to a new era of leaders. As Reagan 每 a famous actor 每 took the reins for America, Gorbachev held onto the failing Soviet Union, and Deng Xiaoping, Mao's successor for China, took their respective roles in the final stretch of the Cold War. Formerly a communist state, the USSR under Gorbachev abolished "communism's emphasis on the class struggle."8 The leaders hoped to follow Kissinger's ideal for Detente; they hoped to "transform ideological conflict into constructive participation in building a better world."9 However, because of the high tensions caused by the Cold War rose in the past, the future of the nations, without a leader, led to no changes to an ideological standpoint on the policy of Détente. Having no true leader, nations fostered by Marxist-Leninist ideals had no choice but to look to America. Throughout the course of 20 years, American relations became less volatile which marked an accomplishment with appeasing the superpowers. Because each nation had the ability to thoroughly destroy each other, it was imperative to keep tensions stable, if not lower.
Although tensions were eased, diplomatic ties between America and the Soviet Union began to crumble. Even though there had been advancements in affairs such as SALT I, the relationship collapsed upon itself as conflicts of interest in Afghanistan sparked strife that resulted in "a failure to end the nuclear arms race" or end "rivalry in the third world."10 Apart from the ongoing peaceful relations, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan purged American ties with Russia. With it, Carter also withdrew the SALT II treaty, following after the successful SALT I treaty. Carter, despite his best efforts 每 even relying on boycotting the Olympics held in Moscow 每 hoped to end the Cold War despite Gromkyo's statement that "the international situation has taken a turn for the worse."11 Even knowing the importance of American spheres of influence in the third world and in Europe, the structural stability of America's "shah" of Iran or Nicaragua was taken by Sandinistas. The overtaking of the shah was met with pathetic resistance on the part of the Americans. Along with this, the impending horror for Carter arose in the invasion of the U.S embassy in Teheran. Holding hostages, the Iranians held an iron grip on the American populace. However, Kissinger blindly stated that America was "bound to decline" as the "USSR recovered after the end of World War II"12 because American troops were at their prime. Through this statement, Kissinger's reliability wavered as the failure of Detente merely concealed the fact that the Soviet Union, along with the Warsaw Pact, was about to collapse.
Reagan sought to push for the end of the Soviet Union as he knew they were about to collapse. He successfully portrayed the Union as "The Evil Empire" out of fear, and because Soviet "geopolitical, ideological, economic, and moral legitimacy equivalent to the United States."13 Along with speeches, Reagan implemented deficit spending, forcing funds into military research to pressure the Soviet Union. Gaddis states that Soviet-American stature was based on stability. The Cold War was not the "nuclear balance defined [that] the cold war... or it would continue indefinitely,"14 but the appeal to the Americans that the Soviet Union had achieved an economic status equal to the states, but was quickly falling apart gave the illusion of instability. Reagan, with his deficit spending in buffing the military called for a new initiative called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that would essentially neutralize the threat of nuclear weapons. Along with the SALT treaties, not only was the fa?ade of armament reduction false, Gaddis propels along the theory that it was an organized effort to kill arms control. Reagan "insisted the purpose [of SDI] was not to freeze nuclear weapons, but render them impotent and obsolete."15 As he appealed to the American public, he reiterated the importance of American pride as a world superpower. Reagan's push for the abolition of nuclear weapons established him as the first of presidents to consider the destruction of nuclear weapons. With the help of the SDI initiative, Reagan was on track to end the nuclear threat. However, SDI, which required resources and technology not available even today, was an almost impossible task. Although Reagan's push for a non-nuclear nation did not materialize, his attempts 每 such as SDI 每 prompted the Soviet Union to proclaim "the great technological potential of the U.S and [treated] Reagan's statement as a real threat."16 An example of Soviet fear materialized itself as the Russians shot down a South Korean airliner when straying over Soviet airspace. Andropov, the head of the K.G.B eventually stated that it was a "provocation organized by the U.S,"17 unwilling to admit his mistake. The fear induced into the Soviet Union led to a paranoia that hindered competent decisions to lead the country.
Although Gorbachev knew that the Soviet Union was not destined to stay a communist state, he, unlike other world leaders, did not know where to turn whether it is democracy, or be taken under the wing of another world power. After his successful run, he did not know what to carry out; he had no vision for the future. He let his "more far-sighted contemporaries determine is own priorities,"18 relaying on the facade that incorporated the "stronger personalities who surrounded him."19 Once a pioneer in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was reduced to spectator status. Even as his status waned, his cooperation with Reagan sparked new relations between the two. Reclaiming composure after a disastrous summit, Gorbachev and Reagan proposed that their nations respectively "commit themselves to ridding the world of nuclear weapons by the year 2000"20 although it seemed hardly possible. Reagan ushered that SDI would end nuclear threat and Gorbachev, without many options, chose to confide in his new ally. While many Union leaders believed that the United States was trying to deceive them, Gorbachev trusted Reagan; meeting him in person only affirmed it. With nuclear disarmament settled for the time being, both nations had agreed on "if not in SDI technology... then the principle of nuclear abolition,"21 which signaled a revolution in the political world between cold war rivals. The eve of nineteen eighty-seven marked the third treaty in which both nations mutually destroyed medium ranged nuclear warheads such as the SS-20 and the Pershing II that "revived the Cold War tensions"22 only a few years ago.
Gorbachev, knowing his socialist society was failing, stood back and watched because he could not help. Gorbachev, knowing any "attempt to maintain control over unwilling people would degrade the [soviet] system by over stretching resources, discrediting ideology, and resisting forces of democratization."23 Adding on to the Reagan Doctrine, Gorbachev's dynamic speech drove home a point to both the government and people of Eastern Europe that "the door was now open."24 With it, the advocating principles of the speech focused on freedom of choice. As Reagan left his popular role as president, Gorbachev struggled to follow in his footsteps. Nineteen Eighty-Nine marked the 200th year from the ancient regime that governments could support their credibility based on their knowledge of the direction of history. However, a "spontaneous uprising of workers promised to produce a classless society throughout the world,"25 led by Marxists and Leninist hoped to spark another Bolshevik Revolution. Although widespread no success was found and the efforts left a rift that had turned "temporary divisions of the World War II Sentiment into permanent divisions of the post-war era."26 Leaders, however, took notice of the dying Cold War. The fact of the matter was that tensions were solved and there was no need for a "Cold War" so to speak, and therefore, led to the end of the Cold War and eventually, the collapse of the Soviet Union upon itself. Socialism, unable to support itself, would eventually die out and a new Russia would be created from the ashes of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's fall was an unstoppable train; even as leaders tried to stop the upcoming disaster, there was no other choice but to go down with it.
Gorbachev, still in power, trekked across the world and thus gained widespread popularity with his peers and the plebiscites of many other countries. Allowing democracy to take over, Gorbachev instituted and had "already allowed elections in the Soviet Union for a new congress of people's deputies."27 Even in China, the banners read that "In the Soviet union, they have Gorbachev" but "In China, we have whom?"28 demonstrating their love as crowds of adoring fans shouted "Stay here Gorby"29 in a wild frenzy. The cause of this was the Deng Administration that took the reins from Mao. Although their socialist society 每 in their eyes, it was only capitalism draped in communism 每 improved lives, it stunted and disrupted the nation's political expression. Deng, witnessing the love that Gorbachev received from his nation hoped to rattle Gorbachev in a desperate attempt to fight for remaining vestiges of power. As Gorbachev stood over Russia, "nothing was left: what the Red Army had won in World War II, what Stalin had consolidated, what Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and even Chernenko had sought to preserve, was all lost."30, he knew he had to make the best of it as he told Bush to not fear. To not fear that after forty-five years of imminent war diverted, the U.S and Russia would soon be forced to contemplate with each other as they were "doomed to dialogue, coordination, and cooperation. There is no other choice."31 Bush began to re institute talks with Russia about NATO and the Warsaw pact as well as East and West Germany. While East Germany was still a member of the Pact; West Germany 每 along with 250,000 American troops 每 was still a part of NATO. Fear arose as suggestions came to prevent "unified Germany and their dual membership in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact."32 Because the last time Germany was unified, the horrifying events that came into existence frightened not only the Soviet Union, but all Europeans. Gorbachev, rather repetitive in world affairs, had become a major force in the influence of decisions that America made.
Approaching the final days of the Soviet Union's regime, the Yelstin conferences marked the end of Soviet Russia, "abolishing the Communist party of the Soviet Union and confiscated all its property."33 Gorbachev's political body of deputies, although voted by the people, was also disbanded. With the Soviet Union dissolved, Gorbachev signed the papers at Yeltsin formally disbanding the Union and with it, essentially, ended the Cold War. The end of the Cold War 每 after the first and second world wars 每 ended threats for a third world war. The cause of the Soviet Union may have laid itself in Gorbachev's care; although "he wanted to save socialism, he would not use force to do so."34 In it, he differed from the leaders of the Cold war; the others had "destinations along with maps to reach them."35 Gorbachev's seemingly contradictory behavior allowed him to be blinded; he could not achieve his goal of saving socialism without instilling the use of force. Instead, he advocated "Love over peace"36 and eventually became "the most deceiving recipient of the Nobel Prize."36
Spanning the length of four presidencies, the Cold war marked a long struggle for nuclear dominance. In the end, the victor seemed to be the United States as Soviet Russia disbanded and Gorbachev humiliated, leading to the end of the Cold War. While communism still roamed free, the policy of containment from the American ideologies proved to work to an extent. While Russia was not the main source for the communist onslaught, they had believed to have severed communism's head. Nixon's Detente failed miserably. Not only until Reagan stepped in and takes the reins of the presidency does the real power play 每 along with the influence of the new pope, John Paul II 每 begins to dismantle communism and eventually, their capacity and capability of nuclear production. After Reagan's presidency, the final chapters of the Cold War lay with Gorbachev and Bush as their problems grew more secular by the day. As Gorbachev tied up relationships with Germany and several states bordering Russia, he faced humility and greatness in his own respective time. However, his greatest goal 每 to save socialism 每 was a great failure due to his inability to act without a plan. Because of it, the fall of the Soviet Union was able to occur, signifying the official end of the Cold War.
Endnotes
1. Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History 375 Hudson Street: Penguin Group USA 2005
2. Gaddis, John Lewis. 3
3. Gaddis, John Lewis 181
4. Gaddis, John Lewis 182
5. Gaddis, John Lewis
6. Kissinger, Henry 188
7. Gaddis, John Lewis 196
8. Gaddis, John Lewis 197
9. Gaddis, John Lewis 198
10. Gaddis, John Lewis 211
11. Gaddis, John Lewis 212
12. Gaddis, John Lewis 213
13. Gaddis, John Lewis 225
14. Gaddis, John Lewis 226
15. Gaddis, John Lewis 226
16. Gaddis, John Lewis 227
17. Dobrynin. In Confidence 228 / 528
18. Gaddis, John Lewis 230
19. Gaddis, John Lewis 230
20. Gaddis, John Lewis 230
21. Gaddis, John Lewis 232
22. Gaddis, John Lewis 232
23. Gaddis, John Lewis 236
24. Gaddis, John Lewis 236
25. Gaddis, John Lewis 238
26. Gaddis, John Lewis 238
27. Gaddis, John Lewis 242
28. Gaddis, John Lewis 242
29. Gaddis, John Lewis 244
30. Gaddis, John Lewis 248
31. Gaddis, John Lewis 248
32. Gaddis, John Lewis 251
33. Gaddis, John Lewis 256
34. Gaddis, John Lewis 257
35. Gaddis, John Lewis 257
36. Gaddis, John Lewis 257
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