Idealism to Isolationism

A Review of Robert H. Ferrell’s American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy

Robert H. Ferrell was born in 1921 has written several books about American political and diplomatic history. He holds a Ph.D. from Yale and taught from 1953 to 1974 at Indiana University. This book is the second in a three-volume set, the first centering on the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the third on the diplomacy of the New Deal.

BY EMILY STURMAN

American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933, by Robert H. Ferrell concentrates on why and how diplomatic ideologies of the period proved unsuccessful in promoting world peace and economic stability. It also examines diplomacy at a personal level, identifying the idiosyncrasies as well as the ideologies of the major American statesmen who influenced the course of world events. Aiming to explain America’s part in a crisis that “was the principal reason for the international tragedy of the 1930s—the loss of all gains of the Allied victory of the first World War,” Ferrell has written a thorough and convincing record of one of the most significant turning points in American political history.1

Though the stock market crashed in 1929, the full effect of the Great Depression was not felt until 1930-31. Accordingly, the American spirit during the early Hoover administration was generally optimistic, buoyed by surface peace and perceived prosperity. American diplomats, President Hoover, and Secretary of State Henry Stimson believed that the World War had been an aberration that could not happen again, that Britain and France could manage European stability by themselves, that China and Japan could get along with just occasional guidance, and that continuing peace would rest be achieved through moral, not military force—that the moral scruples of the people would prevent governments from waging war. The policies undertaken by American statesmen included adherence to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and Nine-Power Treaty, further disarmament, arbitration of foreign disputes, and collection of war debts and reparations. The first test of these methods came in Manchuria, in a dispute between China and Russia over control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The threat of war led Stimson to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact to discourage the two countries from resorting to combat, and because war was not declared, Stimson announced that the first test of the Pact had been a success. However, Ferrell regards these actions as proof of American ignorance of the complexities of the Far Eastern balance of power: both powers were bluffing, too weak to risk war, and by the time Stimson invoked the Pact, China and Russia were already negotiating their own settlement. Disarmament was also an uncertain success of American foreign policy. When Hoover and Stimson met British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald for the Rapidan Conference of 1929, all agreed that the best method for ensuring peace was through limitation and Anglo-American naval parity. These two concepts were further discussed at the London Naval Conference of January 1930, this time with Japan, France, and Italy. A paper victory for the United States, the conference established the first complete naval limitations treaty, but Ferrell argues that the treaty added little new to international naval limitation and detracted from its few benefits by exacerbating existing strife—Japanese nationalists were violently opposed to the treaty’s restrictions, and Italy and France refused to sign. Furthermore, France remained seriously concerned about Germany, which was weakened by the War and the Treaty of Versailles but steadily growing in industrial and military capacity. Ferrell concludes that “perhaps the conference of 1930 had a certain moral value, being an affirmation of faith in the limiting of armaments,” but he expresses little enthusiasm for a policy that, like idealistic agreements to avoid war, would not survive once the Great Depression fully set in.2

President Hoover is notorious for his reluctance to act in the economic crisis, but his attitude changed in the spring of 1931, when the Depression proved “to be an economic crisis—no mere ‘disturbance’ such as statesmen and economists and businessmen had announced at its outset.”3 Impelled by threats of defaulting by several nations, he first established a moratorium on war debts and reparation payments. Though Ferrell approves of Hoover’s decision, he logs debt and reparations alongside disarmament as issues that proved more divisive than they ought to have been, “keeping nations at loggerheads while they should have been thinking of how to preserve and ensure peace.”4 Economic preoccupations proved dangerous when conflict broke out again in Manchuria, this time between China and Japan. The League of Nations tried to solicit American intervention, but Hoover chose to do nothing, as diplomatic intelligence (and competence) in Asia was lacking and his most pressing concern economics. Japanese forces continued to advance. Eventually, Stimson convinced Hoover that Japan’s newfound aggression justified sending a delegate to the League of Nations, empowered only to enter discussion when the Kellogg-Briand Pact was involved. It was clear that the presence of the American delegate was a gesture only, as American opinion remained firmly opposed to further foreign entanglements. Eventually, Japan proposed an investigation, though it never promised to end hostilities. Regardless of Japan’s intentions, the delegate returned assured that peace would be preserved and that America need not take further action.

Japan, however, continued to advance, and when it controlled Manchuria, Stimson sent notes to China and Japan, beginning the policy of “nonrecognition of the fruits of aggression,” the Stimson Doctrine.5 Though most of the League of Nations agreed not to recognize the Japanese puppet state of “Manchukuo,” Stimson’s highly moral approach to foreign policy proved ineffective in dealing with a totalitarian state. His response to Japan’s attack on Shanghai was even less effective: knowing that if he made a statement that would necessitate a response his bluff would be called, he claimed in an open letter that if Japan continued to violate the Nine-Power Treaty, America would be forced to break the Washington Treaty and resume fortification of its eastern holdings. Unfortunately, his statement was widely ignored, even by Hoover, who announced America would not use military force against Japan. The situation was later resolved diplomatically between China and Japan. America’s growing impotency in foreign affairs was further revealed at the World Disarmament Conference of February 1932. Citizens and diplomats had high hopes that the conference would resolve the mounting tensions in Europe, but public opinion was against excessive involvement in the negotiations. In the end, the main effect of the conference was to make France’s demands for increased security sound like paranoid militarism, while the requests of Chancellor Hitler seemed more reasonable. The one foreign policy success of the Hoover administration recognized by Ferrell is the “good neighbor” policy towards Latin America. The Clark Memorandum did not reject interposition entirely, but it denied that Roosevelt’s Corollary logically followed from the Monroe Doctrine, clearly ending the “era of tutelage and instruction by force.”6 The situation in Latin America was badly unstable throughout the Depression, but Hoover’s decision not to intervene unless explicitly asked to do so served America well when the Second World War began.

Already hampered by the economic crisis and isolationist sentiment at home, the Hoover administration lost all international clout when Franklin Roosevelt was elected in 1932. To make things worse, Hoover and Roosevelt hated each other. Stimson was desperate to preserve the fragile peace, so with Hoover’s grudging consent he met with Roosevelt, but the president elect did not agree to any real policies: when he took office, Roosevelt made it very clear that domestic crises were of much greater concern than foreign crises. His renunciation of foreign policy came in the midst of the World Economic Conference of June 1933, and his decision not to allow American delegates to contribute meaningfully to the debate had the effect of “torpedoing” the conference: the delegates could thereafter draw up no meaningful resolutions, though the French nearly succeeded in passing a motion condemning FDR.7 The conference would be America’s last contribution to world peace until the Second World War.

Ferrell’s thesis is that the success of U.S. diplomacy during the 1930s depended on a combination of the economic realities of the Depression, the ideologies and assumptions of American statesmen, their temperaments and capabilities, and of course the nature of each individual problem; also, the overreaching goal of foreign policy was to preserve the fragile peace crafted after World War I. The economic crisis drew attention away from foreign affairs, adding to a climate of isolationism, especially as Hoover blamed Europe for the Depression. The “peculiar heritage” of diplomatic philosophies at this time determined the direction and extent of actions taken to influence foreign events.8 Differences in temperament and petty rivalries among members of the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations and their foreign counterparts influenced the diplomatic process, sometimes with dramatic and other times with indefinite effects on the eventual outcome. Some problems, such as instabilities in Latin America, were perhaps best served by a nonviolent, noninterventionist approach, but others, including both German and Japanese aggression, grew all the more dangerous for want of a strong American response. With a few exceptions, Ferrell concludes that American diplomacy was unsuccessful in achieving its main objective, preserving the peace, mainly because of the preoccupation of the Hoover and especially Roosevelt administrations with the domestic crisis. Primarily a political history, this book assumes the actions of statesmen to be the greatest influences on the world; though references are made to cultural, philosophical, and economic interpretations of history, all are viewed only in relation to the political course of events. As the book is primarily concerned with political events, this assumption does not create an unacceptable amount of blind spots, though Ferrell may overlook a few factors.

As this book was published in 1957, in the aftermath of World War II and the midst of the Cold War, it is possible that Ferrell’s view of “success” in foreign policy is influenced by recent events. Despite violence and political upheaval in Latin America during the Depression, Ferrell supports Hoover’s decision not to intervene because the resulting decrease in enmity between the United States and Latin America was vital to victory in World War II. Ferrell considers the “jettisoning [of] the outworn policies of tutelage and forcible instruction, even at the expense of undoubted American rights,” an acceptable trade in both ideological and practical terms, because it contributed to continental harmony, and therefore strong defense.9 But had the war not proven the necessity of a strong pan-American union, would Ferrell have been so supportive? Avoiding detail, Ferrell hints at the price by which this union was bought. Furthermore, he condemns the reasoning behind the decision to avoid involvement in Asian affairs, and one must question whether not meddling in the East is ideologically different from not meddling in Latin America. Ferrell fails to clearly distinguish between the two areas, in both of which America had exerted considerable influence before the Depression. His reasoning here is justifiable, but based on eventual results, not ideology—in Latin America, isolationism was permissible because it allowed for a strong defense, and in Asia isolationism was unacceptable because it allowed an enemy to gain power.

Reviews of this book have been mixed, but overall approving and respectful of the thoroughness of Ferrell’s research even when disagreeing with his conclusions. Richard Current praises Ferrell’s interpretation for “charity as well as clarity,” but adds that “perhaps it is too charitable,” an unusual fault in an analysis of the Hoover administration.10 Ferrell does not entirely condemn the Hoover or Roosevelt administrations or their members, though he recognizes their faults. Yet Ferrell anticipates this argument, reminding the reader that the Great Depression was an entirely unprecedented event, asking, “How, at the sudden beginning of such a time of trouble, could one fairly reproach American or European statesmen for uncertainty and timidity?”11 Another interesting critique comes from Nathaniel Peffer, who questions whether it was merely economic turmoil that “palsied the hands of American statesmen.”12 Peffer argues that Stimson was “aware of economic distress and the danger it carried,” but that what truly made him powerless to actively involve America in preserving world peace was “the realization that the country would not support him in such a course.”13 In fact, Ferrell does make oblique references to the weight of public opinion in favor of isolationism, some of the more passive positions Hoover took being desperate attempts to secure reelection. However, the effect of the popular mood is not a major part of Ferrell’s thesis, and this is ironic considering Hoover’s own belief in the importance of the “moral force of world public opinion” in national and international affairs.14 Even though Ferrell’s book is a political history, this is perhaps a crucial oversight because democracies, like the United States, are unique in that popular opinion becomes as much a part of politics as the views of national leaders.

As a whole, American Diplomacy is an interesting and important, though not revolutionary, interpretation of an often-overlooked topic. Ferrell’s thesis is clear and well-supported and he does an excellent job of synthesizing a wide array of sources into a coherent conclusion, down to the notes passed by delegates at international conferences. For a reader with only a cursory interest in foreign policy during the Great Depression, the attention Ferrell devotes to explaining both the American situation and conditions overseas may become tiresome, but a serious student will find this work invaluable. Ferrell’s argument is firmly grounded in evidence, with no facet unexplained and few relevant avenues unexplored.

Ferrell argues that the Great Depression dramatically altered American diplomacy. It was the first economic collapse on a global scale in modern history, and just as it revolutionized domestic policies, so also it changed foreign policy. Social theorists had long been trading theories on the decline of civilizations, wondering whether Western civilization might fall as Rome did, torn apart by one war too many. With the advent of the Depression, however, “it seemed evident that Western civilization might collapse not from war, a political event, but from the awful impact of economic chaos brought on by a Great Depression.”15 Consequently, statesmen realized they could “No longer…concern themselves so exclusively with political matters.”16 The Hoover Moratorium and the World Economic Conference were America’s first reluctant actions in accordance with this fact. Ferrell adds, however, that the shift in policy in America and the world was too little too late. Instead of taking action to uphold world peace and stability during the economic crisis, America turned inward to concentrate on domestic problems, allowing militant leaders to take advantage of poor conditions in their countries and rise to power, most notably in Japan and Germany. It is not altogether certain that American intervention could have averted World War II, but Ferrell argues that the economic crisis of the 1930s and the resulting war clearly marked the end of an era in diplomacy.

Evidence of the effects of isolationism aside, the Depression was a turning point for American foreign policy if only because it was the crisis that tested widely-accepted philosophies. American capitalism and democracy were tried and managed to hold their ground; classical economics did not. Likewise, diplomatic doctrines such as disarmament, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and even isolationism itself were all tested in the Depression, and many failed to prove their worth. The America that emerged from Depression and the ensuing World War was radically different from the country under the Hoover administration. The America that faces the recession of the 21st century is highly active in attempting to ensure international stability, militarily engaged in several countries and fiscally in many more. Only time will tell whether these foreign engagements weaken or strengthen a world order under economic duress.

The Great Depression was a tragedy for diplomacy, a time in which “the triumph of events over intelligence” began to unravel the tenuous world order established after World War I.17 America entered the postwar world idealistic and hopeful for a future where war would no longer be a method for settling international disagreements. These hopes were crushed when diplomats found themselves crippled by economic distress and popular reluctance at home, and those who turned from the domestic crisis long enough to see the events unfolding on a global scale watched helplessly as the stage was set for the next World War.

Endnotes

Student Bio

Emily Sturman was born in 1993 in Niskayuna, New York. Since then, she has lived in North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and California. When not doing homework, she sings and plays the oboe, and when not doing that, she makes costumes, plays computer games, and reads.