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A review of Anthony Short’s The Origins of the Vietnam War

To describe the Vietnam War as “impressive, somewhat mechanical, and rather frightening” would be to oversimplify a war whose outset launched the United States into an era of unprecedented international animosity and culminated in the triumph of communism over democracy.1 Though its end resulted in far-reaching consequences that would ultimately lead to a lull in Cold War hostilities, Vietnam was the battleground of the United States and the Soviet Union as both sides struggled to impose their political ideologies upon the nation. Despite this, the author notes that one of the most difficult questions regarding the war is when exactly “when and how the war began.”2 Anthony Short analyzes the events that led up to the outbreak of the Vietnam War in his book The Origins of the Vietnam War in order to discover the roots of the conflict.

Short begins in the 1800s, when imperialist France sought to colonize Vietnam; conflict between the oppressors and the oppressed  contributed to the outbreak of the First Indochina War. French foreign minister Jules Ferry’s declaration that nations become “great…not by the peaceful extension of institutions but by becoming involved in the affairs of the world” reflected imperialist theory that a country can only be powerful if it acquires an empire. While Vietnam’s rulers crowned the last member of their dynasty, French navy ships were anchoring in the port of Haiphong and began a bombardment of the city. In 1858, the French continued their plans to control Vietnam by leading a military expedition and establishing the colony of Cochinchina; by 1885, they controlled all of the country by establishing a protectorate in Tonkin, a puppet emperor in Annam, and a colony in Cochinchina. Sporadic surges of Vietnamese nationalism convinced the French to restrict the natives by denying them education and levying high taxes. The Vietnamese Revolutionary League - a precursor to the Vietnamese Communist Party – and the Nationalist Quoc Dan Dang were formed in response to these repressive policies. However, after the beginning of World War II, the Japanese took over Vietnam after defeating the French; their brutal policies forced revolutionary forces to decide to “liberate Indochina from [colonists].”4

In 1945, the “August Revolution” brought drastic changes to Vietnam when the Japanese led a coup and imprisoned the French, revolutionary Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam with assistance from China, and the emperor declared Vietnamese independence. Though the emperor later abdicated and the French declared their intentions to keep their former colony, the nationalist Viet Minh rebel group were able to gain the assistance of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). After World War II ended, however, British General Gracey assisted the French in taking back Saigon that left “150 French civilians, including many women and children, massacred.”5 France remained unwilling to make concessions to the Viet Minh until the Ho-Sainteny Agreement, which allowed the French to occupy Tonkin and recognized Vietnam as a free state in the French Union. However, despite this apparent compromise, “attacks on French soldiers and civilians” by guerrilla rebel groups did not cease and neither did French retaliation.6 When Viet Minh soldiers destroyed a power plant in Hanoi in 1946, France declared war. Although the United States attempted to mediate, representatives were clearly allied with France because they believed that “France was more important than Vietnam… and a party aspiring to be government.”7The product of negotiations was the Far Eastern Memorandum, which recommended that France recognize Vietnam as its equal and make its membership in the French Union optional. Eventually, however, the French convinced the U.S. to recognize emperor Bao Dai, who they believed would provide a better regime than that of “Commie domination…in Indochina.”8

In 1952, the French had all but announced their decision to end the bloodshed when Ferry declared that “France would not hesitate to make peace…if an armistice can be concluded under honorable conditions.”9 The United States began to increase their involvement in Vietnamese affairs, believing that the presence of a Communist government run by the Viet Minh in Southeast Asia would “endanger… American security interests.”10 Fearing an expansion of Communism throughout Asia, the United States contributed 20 B-26 aircraft to France’s efforts to keep Vietnam in the French Union; the U.S., wary of both a war that would “absorb our troops by divisions” and Chinese intervention on the side of the Viet Minh, avoided deploying soldiers.11At the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, French forces were defeated despite U.S. assistance and withdrew from Vietnam. Taking place during the conflict was the Geneva Conference of 1954, where the U.S. declared a firm and resolute stand against communism and touted the belief that “the [First Indochina War] had not been lost…it had hardly begun.”12 At the same conference, the Viet Minh sought aid and alliances with China and the Soviet Union.

Soon afterwards, Bao Dai appointed Ngo Dinh Diem, an anti-communist prime minister that relied heavily on “U.S. assistance in every possible form…including refugee relief, training of troops, and armed U.S. intervention.”13 Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh signed a peace settlement with France and signed a cessation of hostilities agreement that prohibited both the U.S. and China from establishing military bases. With a temporary peace now in place, the question for future leadership of Vietnam was now relevant. South Vietnam held power only nominally, and the U.S. discouraged free elections because it feared a Communist victory. Diem, an unpopular leader who alienated his country, was grasping at straws and attempting to appeal to the Central Intelligence Agency for formal support; U.S. agents in Vietnam, however, still were “convinced that Diem cannot organize and administer a strong government.”14 The U.S. now questioned if it should back Diem, who seemed incapable of managing his country and appealed to a select few minority groups. It was at this point that General Collins, the U.S. military adviser in Vietnam, suggested replacing Diem so that the U.S. could be poised to effect more control over Vietnam. However, the South Vietnam government began a crusade against the Communist Party and began systematically wiping out branches; Communists in the north began refusing Southern refugees, signifying a change in North-South relations. Rising tensions between two sides of the divided country ultimately culminated in war, with the U.S. allying with South Vietnam.

Short’s purpose in writing the Origins of the Vietnam War was to “answer…when and how the war began”15 and analyze the political ramifications behind colonial rule of Vietnam. The author does not focus on U.S. involvement,  but rather investigates how French policy shaped Vietnam into a nation affixed with an eternal conflict between the oppressors and the oppressed. This detachment from seeing history from the United States’ perspective allows readers to see the U.S.’s growing involvement in Vietnam from a nonpartisan point of view.

Anthony Short’s background as a “temporary soldier in Malaya in 1949” made him “immediately aware of the war that had started in Vietnam” and made him interested in examining the spread of Communism throughout the world.16 Upon returning to Malaya in 1963, he joined a school specializing in guerrilla warfare, learned how to fight in the jungle, and engaged in a study of the role of foreign intervention within the Communist insurrection in Malaya. Having personally served in a war initiated by the spread of Communism, Short’s involvement “rekindled his interest in what was happening in Vietnam.” The author mentions that at some point during his time in Malaya, he had a shift in perspective “that was a direct challenge to the assumptions and comparisons [he] had made before.” For example, although Short had originally held a more idealistic, glorified view of the battle at Ap-Bac in Vietnam, he later became disillusioned with the narrowness of that victory and began paying more meticulous attention to policy. To that end, he takes great pains to compile and analyze the motivations of each individual and nation during events such as the Geneva Conference, in order to emphasize the real motives behind their actions.

 J. Cable’s review of Origins of the Vietnam War from the British International Relations academic journal praises Short for doing an excellent job emphasizing the tragic events that led to the Vietnam War and effectively analyzing the underlying causes and motives behind the most important decisions of the era. The review notes how “Short sketches the French impact on the nineteenth and early twentieth century, but he is mainly concerned to how… the United States moved from casual involvement...to outright [participation in the] war,” though it comments that Short excelled at analyzing the impact of events and noting where points in history might have taken a turn for the better. However, Cable still disagrees with some of Short’s interpretations and opinions, saying for example that “the extent to which the Geneva Conventions Agreements offered the chance to follow a less disastrous course” was “a more open question than Short is willing to admit.”4 This may reflect the prevailing perspective of historians at the time, which was based on staunch anti-communist John Foster Dulles’ reports of the Geneva Convention, which were meant to rationalize United States involvement by stating that there were no “reasonable” alternatives. In addition, Cable criticizes how Short barely dwells on Chinese, Russian, and North Vietnamese alternatives and negotiations throughout the novel.

 Short did an excellent job analyzing the origins of the Vietnam War. He gives an in-depth analysis of the motives of every involved party during a conflict and allows readers to see the goals of each. For example, when discussing the Geneva Convention, he notes how “Australia and New Zealand could be brought to subscribe to common purposes one could at least pretend that there was some sort of incipient free-world community” while “at Geneva there was something less than a united communist front,” and the French believed “that the war could only be ended as the result of some form of international negotiation in the course of which the Chinese could be persuaded to drop their support of Ho Chi Minh.” Short further juxtaposes these clashes in ideology by giving historical context - American policy was influenced by the failure of containment in the Korean War, French policy was dominated by a fear of losing their empire, the Viet Minh supported China and Russia to obtain support, and Russians wanted to avoid the conflict altogether as all outcomes to the Vietnam War were not particularly favorable. However, Short’s organization is sometimes hard to follow because of his lack of use of a chronological approach. For example, he mentions Diem’s death long before he even discusses Diem’s domestic policies and the United States intervention in his rise to power. In other areas, he focuses more on how an event could have ended or what it may have portended then discussing its actual consequences; his extensive analysis of hypothetical outcomes diverts too much attention from his analysis of the impact of what actually happened.

 The 1950s, if judged by the United States endeavors in foreign policy in Vietnam, were a time of conservatism and paranoia. Communist groups had attempted everything within their power to make Vietnam “for practical purposes...a one-party state.” Additionally, the United States pursued an aggressively interventionist policy to “seek to increase the confidence of President Diem and his government.”6 Both were attempts to maintain the status quo and ensure that there would be no future challenges to established power dynamics.  The Truman and Eisenhower administrations both used the Domino Theory – the idea that if one nation succumbed to Communism, all surrounding governments would fall as well – to justify their increasing involvement in the Vietnam War as casual funding and economic support for the French became outright arms dealership.  The justification given was that, unless checked, Communism in Southeast Asia would spread to India and then the Middle East. In order to prevent changes in government, the United States was even willing to repress free elections in Vietnam and thus suppress the liberties of the South Vietnamese. In the 1950s, the United States was attempting to maintain the hardline stance against Communism developed by Truman. The author tends to agree that French and American efforts to maintain the governments of Vietnam despite popular disapproval were conservative in nature.

 The Vietnam War was caused as much by American fear of communist expansion as it was by Vietnamese nationalist movements. Short argues that it would be impossible to pinpoint the exact cause of the conflict, but provides insight into the many conflicts that contributed to the eruption of the war. Although the French colonists had initiated the pattern of oppressing the native Vietnamese, in replacing the French Americans ultimately had become what they most despised: antiquated imperialists attempting to impose their will on a free people, sparking resurgence in conservatism that would later inspire revolution.

Footnotes:

Short, Anthony. The Origins of the Vietnam War. New York: Longman Inc., 1989.xiii.

  Short, Anthony. XI.

  Short, Anthony. 1.

  Short, Anthony. 36.

 Short, Anthony. 45

  Short, Anthony. 56.

  Short, Anthony. 70.

  Short, Anthony. 78.

  Short, Anthony. 103.

  Short, Anthony. 107.

 Short, Anthony. 125.

  Short, Anthony. 155.

  Short, Anthony. 177.

  Short, Anthony. 196.

  Short, Anthony. XI.

  Short, Anthony. XVI.

  Short, Anthony. XIII.

  Short, Anthony. XIII.

  Cable, J.”The Origins of the Vietnam War by Anthony Short.” International Relations 10.1 (1990):91-92. Print.

  Cable, J. 91.

  Short, Anthony. 160.

  Short, Anthony. 210.

  Short, Anthony. 239.

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A review of Peter Lowe’s The Origins of the Korean War

“Korea was not important enough to warrant a deep American commitment but was too important to be allowed to go communist.”1 This paradoxical statement sets the stage for Peter Lowe’s second edition of The Origins of the Korean War. Published in 1997, his work explores the circumstances of the Korean peninsula prior to the outbreak of war and developments in foreign nations that impacted political decisions in Washington. By scrutinizing numerous treaties, speeches, and negotiations, Lowe illustrates the inevitable road to division of Korea during the height of Cold War tensions. The superpowers clashed over mutual suspicions as the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States—between communism and democracy—spread across the Pacific to Korea, a nation unstable from constant foreign occupation and internal divisions.

Lowe’s work discusses the “political and social evolution” of Korea by considering both the internal desire for unity and foreign intervention.2 Lowe traces the origins of the war back to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 after which Japan imposed military control over Korea. Although the Japanese administration was harsh on Koreans, it was effective in ruling Korea despite opposition to annexation from both the left and right. In particular, conservative nationalist Syngman Rhee and his followers gained prestige by urging for the establishment of a separate government while different factions of Korean communism failed to unite in their objectives. Agreeing to adopt trusteeship after World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union decided that Korea was unprepared for independence and required a period of readjustment.  America, disinclined to commit to Korea yet wanting to prevent Korea from falling within Soviet sphere of influence, sternly contemplated its role in international politics. Still, to prevent Russians from dominating the whole of Korea, America planned to occupy part of the terrain and accept the 38th parallel, which marked the division of the Korean soil between the Soviet-controlled north and American-controlled south. With the American proposal that elections be held in both parts of Korea, the UN became “heavily involved in Korean affairs” as a “vehicle of American foreign policy.”3 However, North Korea failed to join the UN and relations between the two Korean states began to deteriorate. North Korea’s government, led by Kim Il Sung, successfully won international recognition throughout the world by associating with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic while South Korea’s republic suffered from instability as guerillas threatened infrastructure. Consequently, the United States proposed an uneasy middle policy by withdrawing troops by 1949 whilst maintaining military aid to stop Korea from going communist. However, the Americans ignored Korean wishes for a united and independent nation.

Meanwhile, events uncoiled in Korea’s neighboring countries, Japan and China. As the marginalized Emperor became a mere figurehead, the Japanese economy revived and became self-sufficient at the expense of the American economy. General MacArthur of the U.S. Army wanted to establish defense forces in Japan against possible Soviet aggression while Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister of Japan in 1948, fostered hopes of democracy and restoration to “true independence.”4 The gradual progression of Japan posed a threat to North Korea, which recalled harsh Japanese suppression in previous decades. Britain thought the prolonged occupation of the United States to be dangerous and leaned toward a middle path which would tie the Japanese to the West without aggressive tendencies. Meanwhile in China, civil war broke out with the defeat of the Kuomintang and the subsequent rise of the communists under Mao Tse-tung. Mao castigated American imperialism as the “‘major enemy’ of the Chinese people” and initially worked closely with Moscow.5 When China fell to communism in 1949, the British quickly recognized (although it did not approve of) the communist government while Americans lamented the loss of China. For American policy-makers, the significance of nationalist Taiwan was a pending issue that began to estrange interests of the Truman administration from those of MacArthur, who wished to support the Kuomintang. The National Security Council resolved that Taiwan was “strategically important” but not of such “compelling military value” for U.S. commitment for occupation.6 Meanwhile, Mao visited Moscow and signed the Sino-Soviet agreements in February 1950. The British Foreign Office ascertained the treaty to be a friendly agreement but also a possible communist monolith. Sino-American relations began to deteriorate and Americans expressed hostility toward Chinese communism.

The Cold War crisis deepened in Europe as America and Britain suspiciously eyed the Soviet Union’s expansionist tendencies. The contest between the two superpowers widened the gap between the East and West as World War II ended. Although Stalin resumed nuclear research to secure Soviet influence, he was unprepared for a third world war and only intended to frighten people with the presence of atomic bombs as did Truman, both wishing to avoid conflict. In addition, America offered economic aid to Greece and Turkey through the Truman Doctrine when Britain withdrew its commitment from the Balkans. Another form of economic assistance, the Marshall Plan, which promised to aid European recovery and contain communism, was “warmly welcomed” by the British government whose economy had become severely weakened.7 America’s economic assistance, along with the crisis in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, intensified the Cold War in Europe. With limited independence in Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party was able to gain power and support from the working class from 1945 to 1948. When National Socialists and members of the Democratic parties protested against “communist [policies] regarding the police,” the West predicted Soviet involvement with Czechoslovak Communist leaders.8 The crisis amplified Cold War tensions and trepidation over Stalin’s attempts to extend communism. In Germany, Britain and France maintained the division of Berlin when the Soviets threatened to block sectors of Berlin. The United States responded by coordinating a massive air lift that carried vital commodities such as fuel and food to Berliners. The Soviet attempt and subsequent failure in thwarting the creation of a West German state convinced the Western nations to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a joint committee founded upon collective defense. “Suspicion and animosity in Europe” magnified strains in the Korean peninsula, calling for a “firm response” in Korea.9

As the outbreak of the Korean War neared, UN members including Britain supported American intervention in the turmoil in Korea but opposed meddling in Chinese affairs in Taiwan. General MacArthur feared the Communist threat to Taiwan and called for reinforcements from the American Air Force.  The possibility of the fall of Taiwan heightened tensions, which soared when private exchanges foretelling the amalgamation of the two crises between South Korea’s Syngman Rhee and the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan took place. As of 1950, Stalin wanted to utilize Korea to outsmart the Americans, the United States abstained from binding promises, and Mao expressed his desire to develop Manchuria. Determined to assert Chinese power, Mao led his nation to intervene in the Korean War, leading the United States to finally act after receiving news of a North Korean advance. Aggression in Korea paralleled that of Germany and Truman was conscious of previous errors in dealing with Hitler. Although the UN endorsed containment in Korea, British Prime Minister Atlee did not wish to commit. In September of 1950, MacArthur, confident of success, ignored warnings and led a risky assault to recapture Seoul, the capital of South Korea. The Inchon landing, his full-scale invasion on North Korea, was thwarted by Chinese intervention that led to a humiliating defeat and withdrawal. Although MacArthur had thought there would be “little chance of Chinese or Russians interfering,” the Chinese did enter the war and brought about the end of the origins of the Korean War. 10 The rapid succession of events—the North Korean advance, the UN counter-attack, and the intervention of China—marked the crisis as both an international and civil war. Korea was the “victim of… [the] internal animosities and mutual suspicions of the superpowers in the Cold War.”11

Lowe largely devoted his book to the diplomatic relations between the superpowers and the political decisions by European and Asian nations. He contends that the origins of the Korean War are “best understood [by]…developments in the Korean peninsula, in China, Japan and in Europe.”12 Shaped by foreign intervention, the divided Korea faced constant occupation and succumbed to the policies of the major world powers. The recovery of Japan with American assistance posed a latent threat and sparked bitter resentment in North Korea, leading Kim Il Sung to attack the counterpart South. Taiwan, a refuge state which had emerged as a result of Mao’s revolution, was often grouped with South Korea in the West’s view of foreign involvement against communism, as heated tension from Cold War in Europe “magnif[ied] developments in the Korean peninsula.”13 Ultimately, the origins of the war culminated in Communist China’s intervention as China proved its new significance and leading role in the world. In addition, Lowe notes that America remained in perpetual reluctance concerning Korean affairs since 1945. Although the United States desired to thwart the spread of communism, it lacked the inclination to commit to the Korean peninsula until Chinese intervention forced it to do so. Thus, Lowe asserts that the Korean War was not an abrupt conflict that arose merely from North Korea’s assault but rather, a gradual culmination of “ideological differences” and “internal [and] external animosities.”14

As a British historian, Peter Lowe primarily concerns his book with British reactions to the developments in East Asia. He offers a counterpoint to the controversial topic of political and military conduct in the Korean War distinct from that of the accounts of American authors. He has also studied Japanese history extensively as a member of the Japan Society and was recognized for research in Anglo-Japanese diplomatic relations. Lowe has since published other works such as Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia and Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China, and Korea. His interest in East Asia as a whole contributes to his discussions of developments in Japan and China in The Origins of the Korean War. Lowe largely expresses the British view of American policy and developments in Korea, labeling plans from Washington as “blundering” and American generals “inept.”15 In contrast to the hesitant, ambiguous American policy, British attitude, according to Lowe, was “essentially straightforward” and “devoid of ideological bias.”16 Lowe’s nationality seems to be the biggest contributor to his personal bias. The second edition of his book on the Korean War, published in 1997, focuses more on the first year of the war with details about the conduct and dismissal of General MacArthur.

By the late 1990s, the Cold War had ceased and the world witnessed the beginning of a new millennium, yet the news of the mass starvation and famine in North Korea shocked the public. The world was reminded once again that the totalitarian regime of North Korea refused to cooperate with international aid organizations and instead allocated domestic relief funds to defense programs. Renewed interest in the North Korean crisis along with new evidence and information available about the Korean War enabled Lowe to write a second edition of The Origins of the Korean War and reveal the genesis of the longstanding rift between the North and the South.

Associate professor of history at the University of Southern California, James I. Matray, contends that without “consistent analysis and a unifying theme,” Lowe's account "lacks balance and coherence."17 According to Matray, the title itself is inconsistent with the text, since Lowe devotes less than half the book to describing the origins of the Korean War prior to June 1950. Instead, he "idl[y] speculates about possible reunification after the death of Km Il Sung" and speaks of truce talks that do not correlate with the misleading title.18 Although Lowe states that the divided Korea was a result of an international conflict that heated the Cold War, the author "rarely demonstrates direct connection between events outside Korea and the coming of the war."19 Thus, Lowe's account is but a mere reiteration of what is already known about the Korean War. Furthermore, Matray notes that Lowe proves to be ambiguous and tentative when stating that Dean Acheson "and certain others" advocated immediate commitment to halt North Korea's invasion.20 The major flaws in this work discourage its use as historical reference and discredits the author for his inclination to defend British perspective and policy.

Lowe’s book outlines the causes of the Korean War and the tentative policies and proposals by which the United States was forced to intervene. The analysis of the origins of the war, however, differs from the norm in that the book focuses on the developments in China and Japan in regards to the Korean conflict. Yet Lowe’s implicit statements make it difficult to draw connections between circumstances in the Korean War and in other East Asian countries. He titles his sub-chapters “The Significance of Taiwan” and “Role of China” without explicitly expounding how foreign intervention correlates with the escalation of tensions leading to the Korean War. Lowe focuses on diplomatic and political issues, including details on the multiplicity of contending parties with differing agendas. However, this plethora of speculations and opinions of individuals and nations overwhelms the book with provisional information that lacks enlightening truths. On the other hand, Lowe places the Korean War, a local dispute, in context of the international conflict, the Cold War, to present both a microcosmic and macrocosmic view of the global war. It is also interesting to note that Lowe considers Kim Il Sung a deft leader who initiated the plan to invade South Korea even before Stalin’s encouragement. Contrary to popular belief, Kim was not a mere puppet of Stalin, and Lowe sheds light on the future of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

To Lowe, the 1950s was a time of conservatism and stasis rather than that of progress and liberalism when discussing the conflict in Korea. In the preface of the book, Lowe asserts that “American policy regarding Korea vacillated” between intervention and non-commitment.21 Although the divided Koreas drew support from different benefactors and heightened Cold War tensions between the superpowers, no significant progress was made to thwart communism or to establish democracy. Even after losing China to communism, America remained indecisive to Korea. The NSC spent “much time evaluating the strategic significance” of South Korea and Taiwan—and accrued ambiguously in Asia while implementing the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan to help Europe recover from World War II, stopping the spread of communism.22 American policy remained this way and eventually decided to abandon the goal of keeping Korea intact. But in doing so, America ignored the plight of the Koreans who were forcefully separated from their families along the barbed wire of the 38th parallel. At the expense of a minority group of East Asians, the United States was able to prevent plunging into a third world war. By resorting to a conservative solution to swiftly maintain balance in the world, the UN forces along the buffer zone in Korea signed the armistice and ceded the idea of a united, noncommunist Korea. America, then, was only able to prevent half of Korea from falling to communism while the prolonged stalemate did little to substantiate for the countless casualties. For decades the United States took cautious, conservative approaches to preserve democratic institutions that had already existed but took no further step to promote avant-garde liberalism.

Overall, Peter Lowe’s The Origins of the Korean War evaluated the crisis from both domestic and foreign perspectives and examined how it was affected by American policies and the rise of communism.  With mutual suspicions between the Soviet Union and the United Sates as well as discrepancies in foreign policy and military action, the Korean War, perhaps, was inevitable. What resulted from the extension of Cold War in East Asia was a regrettable, bloody conflict that split the Korean peninsula into antagonistic terrains.

Footnotes:

Lowe, Peter. The Origins of the Korean War. 2nd ed. London: Longman, 1997. xiii. Print.

Lowe, Peter. xiii.

Lowe, Peter. 48.

Lowe, Peter. 101.

Lowe, Peter. 113.

Lowe, Peter. 134.

Lowe, Peter. 149.

Lowe, Peter. 152.

Lowe, Peter. 171.

Lowe, Peter. 227.

Lowe, Peter. 252.

Lowe, Peter. x.

Lowe, Peter. 141.

Lowe, Peter. 252

Lowe, Peter. 31.

Lowe, Peter. 120.

Matray, James I. "Origins of the Korean War Book Review." Rev. of Origins of the Korean War. American Historical Review n.d.: 504. Print.

Matray, James I.

Matray, James I.

Matray, James I.

Lowe, Peter. xiii.

Lowe, Peter. 133.

A review of Norman Moss’s Men Who Play God: The Story of the Hydrogen Bomb

Although he recalls himself during the war as “an insignificant packhorse in the Korean War”, Michael Hickey brings his full knowledge and experiences regarding this event in his book The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism 1950 – 1953.1 His extension of history of the Korean War to include historical contexts in Britain, United States, Soviet Union, China and Japan does not only serve his primary purpose to offer  an account of Commonwealth, but also present the material in a vivid manner.

 In the middle of a century that had already seen two destructive and costly global conflicts, a savage war broke out at the extremity of the Asian landmass. During World War II, allies met at Yalta and Potsdam “to discuss the way forward against Japan.”2 Postphoning Korean independence, Korea, which had been a Japanese colony since 1910, was to be divided into 2 zones. In the north, the Soviets backed a Stalinist regime under their client Kim Il-sung and created the North Korean Peoples' Army which was equipped with Russian tanks and artillery. In the south, the chaotic political situation resulted in an American-backed administration under the presidency of Syngman Rhee, whose openly declared aim was the imposition of national unity by force. However, the American-trained South Korean army was limited to a lightly armed gendarmerie, lacking tanks, combat aircraft and all but a small amount of field artillery. Able to observe the South Korea’s military unpreparedness, the North Korean Peoples’ Army, after several years of increasingly bloody frontier incidents along the 38th parallel, invaded the Republic of Korea on June 25 1950. Despite previous warnings, the Pentagon was caught off-guard. As the North Koreans swept south, overwhelming all opposition, the US alerted the Security Council, which in turn invoked the United Nations Charter and brand the North Koreans as aggressors. Member states, such as Australia, were called on to send in military assistance. The first American troops were sent in to stiffen resistance against the invasion force. In addition, the British government responded at once and the Far East Fleet was soon in action along the Korean coast, together with the ships of Commonwealth navies. However, the North Koreans still advanced rapidly south toward the vital port of Pusan. The American troops hurriedly sent from occupation duties in Japan fared badly against trained North Korean troops, but General Walton Walker, on command of the 8th United States Army in Korea (EUSAK), rallied his forces together and held the Pusan bridgehead as rewaited for reinforcements to arrive. These reinforcements included two British battalions from Hong Kong, the Middlesex and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and an Australian battalion from Japan. Furthermore, England mobilized a strong brigade group and recalled several thousand reservists to active duty. The 29th Brigade set sail in October 1950, reaching Korea a month later just as it seemed that the war was over.

 Although this puppet war was seemingly conducted by western nations only, it was actually noted for the significance of China’s contribution. In mid-September, General MacArthur brought a masterstroke by landing two divisions 240km in the enemy rear at the port of Inchon. MacArthur and the enemy’s communications cut, and under heavy aerial bombardment, the North Koreans broke and fled back north; MacArthur ordered a hot pursuit across the 38th parallel and deep into North Korea. As the victorious UN forces neared the Manchurian border, there were ominous signals from Peking that communist China would intervene to defend its territory and evidence; there were numerous “reports of Chinese and North Korean attacks on the ROK III Corps.”3 In mid-October, MacArthur met President Harry Truman on Wake Island to assure him that a massive UN offensive was about to end the war with victory by Christmas. No sooner had this force been launched in November than the Chinese unleashed their armies. The UN forces recoiled in disorder, and by the new year were defending a line well to the south of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Although morale was low, the new field commander, General Ridgway, revived his shaky command and advanced slowly north in the spring of 1951. By mid-April, the allies were back at the 38th parallel, promoting the Chinese to launch their spring offensive. The British 29th Brigade narrowly escaped annihilation on the Imjin river as the 27th Commonwealth brigade on the central front beat off savage Chinese attacks. The UN line held, and then moved north again. This time, there was no reckless advance into the north. The line stabilized near the 38th parallel and the remaining two years of fighting consisted of near-static operations as both sides fought from heavily fortified positions, using artillery, mines, and wire to deny the enemy access to strategically important grounds. Throughout the war, air power was decisive. The US Air Force, Navy and Marines drove the North Korean air force from the skies by using their superior equipment and training. Heavy bombers razed the cities and industrial plants of North Korea, and continuous attacks on the transport system forced the Chinese to rely on the packhorse for much of their logistical support. A new phase of air war from roughly June 25 to July 20, opened when American B-29 bombers and their fighter escorts were challenged by Russian-built MiG-15 fighters flown by Chinese airmen. The MiG-15's outflew first-generation American jet fighters until the introduction of the swept-wing F-86 Sabre tipped the balance. In the world's first supersonic air combat, the Americans prevailed.

 The Allies achieved total naval supremacy when UN firepower blew the North Korean navy's torpedo boats out of the water bay. For the rest of the war, American, British, Commonwealth and other allied ships maintained a tight blockade on North Korea. In addition, naval aviation played a leading role in air support for the ground army. In July 1951, with the arrival of the strong Canadian brigade, the British, Australian, New Zealand and Indian units were formed into the 1st Commonwealth Division, which soon gained an enviable reputation among its Allies. In mid-1951, with the land battle in stalemate, both sides agreed to go to the conference table and armistice talks began, which would drag for two years. Delegates haggled over the future of the tens of thousands of communist prisoners held in camps on Koje Island off the coast of South Korea. While communist negotiators were adamant that all were to be returned to their country of origin, many of these prisoners were unwilling to be repatriated because “as far as the Chinese and North Koreans were concerned, all who were taken prisoner whilst fighting communism were war criminals and thus not entitled to protection.”4There were several great mutinies in the Koje camps before a satisfactory formula enabled those who wished to be repatriated to go home and for asylum to be granted to those who wished otherwise. In July of 1953, a great calm descended over the battlefields and finally, with Operation Big Switch, thousands of former prisoners on each side were returned. A Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) was established on the border. Both sides withdrew from their fighting positions, and a UN commission was to set up a commission to supervise the armistice.

 In a sense the Korean War was a civil war fought with foreign assistance for both sides. It was “the first military test of the United Nations and also the last martial adventure of the old Commonwealth.”5 The American Department of Defense acknowledged that almost 40,000 of its servicemen died, either in battle or of other causes. British casualties were 1,078 killed in action, 2,674 wounded and 1,060 missing or taken prisoner. It is estimated that some 46,000 South Korean soldiers were killed and over 100,000 wounded. The Chinese are estimated by the Pentagon as having lost over 400,000 (including Mao Tse-tung's son) and 486,000 wounded, with over 21,000 captured. The North Koreans lost about 215,000 killed, 303,000 wounded and over 101,000 captured or missing. British veterans of the campaign were left with abiding memories of a South Korea which had been deprived of its dignity, fought over and ruined, its demoralized population brought to beggary and its infrastructure destroyed. Since 1953, the Republic of Korea has been transformed into a thriving modern state. In the North, however, the Stalinist regime created by Kim Il-sung is only now beginning to move out of its hermit state. The economy is in ruins and famine stalks the land. It is too early to say if the tentative moves towards reconciliation will result in attainment of the unity so deeply desired by many Koreans.

 Hickey implies his thesis in the preface briefly: “My intention had been to write an account of what turned out to be the last military adventure of the ‘old’ Commonwealth … I soon became aware of the sheer size of the American involvement and the sacrifice it entailed.”6 Throughout the book, he clearly defines the distinction between the Korean War and previous wars. First, he understands Britain had a small share during the Korean War. While United States and Soviet Union anxiously discussed the fate of the Korean peninsula, “Britain simply wasn’t interested” at all.7 Britain was accused of shirking the defense of Europe. Thus, he interprets the Korean War as the war during which America supplanted Britain as the leading western power. Second, he recognizes contributions of United Nations, which are noticeable but at the same time flawed for its subsequent coalition wars and peacekeeping operations.

 ​Michael Hickey entered the war as a decorated British officer, commanding a transport platoon, and later earned a fellowship in defense at King's College in London. He wrote several books on the British campaigns in Gallipoli during World War I and Burma during World War II. In this book, Hickey, a British officer and a Korean War veteran, reports on the main events of wars fought amid the extreme conditions. He comments on the performance of the armies, drawing on his military expertise to praise the US Marines, their engineers, and the US Air Force for their “heroic performance[s].”8 Because of this bias, Hickey dwells at length on the experiences of the British and Australians, although he concesses that the US contributed most of the manpower, supplies, and air and naval power that decided the outcome of the war. Hickey also examines his views on several commanders, and finds that they have many flaws, especially MacArthur. Hickey doesn’t emphasize the grunts on the firing lines who suffered and died, so there is no tragic sense of the terror, heroics, and high emotion of combat. Hickey's accounts do not romanticize wars; he only offers rational approaches to military strategy.

 David Alperstein, in short, summarizes this book as “a scholarly analysis of both the military and political factors that caused the war and the conduct on all sides.”9 Alperstein notes Hickey’s success in compiling a massive study of the conflict by using firsthand accounts as well as his own experiences. He also praises the breadth of the work, although Hickey concentrates on the involvement of Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries, he also offers considerable coverage of the Unites States and careful discussions of the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian sides of the war. And by using declassified documents along with regimental and personal diaries, Hickey wades through political intrigue and military disasters and important triumphs to give a memorable account.

​ Rob Stout agrees that Hickey presents the history in a way that readers do not become dragged down by historical complexities. The book is a concise overview of the war’s origins and the United States’ intervention. Stout notes that Hickey follows his thesis established in his preface consistently; Hickey focuses largely on the contribution of the Commonwealth forces, but “does not lose sight of the larger political picture, devoting several chapters to the roles played by President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur.”10 Also, by including information about prisoner-of-war camps, covert operations and propaganda campaigns, according to Stout, both Alperstein and Stout agree that Hickey paints a comprehensive picture of the Korean War.

​ Hickey’ work provides a sophisticated interpretation of the Korean War. The volume, which begins with a chronological survey of the war’s headline events from the military attack to the peace talk, presents a series of topical chapters on the civil conflict in Korea before the war, the brutality of war itself, the prison camps and military details. Also, there is a whole devotion on air fighting, as he mentions that the Korean War was "the first war in which high performance jet aircraft met in combat and many air fighting lessons were taught and learned." 11 His focus on military operations, however, is hard to follow if one doesn’t have any information about military technology. He often uses too sophisticated terms and expects his readers to have background knowledge since he was a soldier. But generally, his ability to mention actions of all nations in one book should be commended. He is aware of accurate history of not only Korea, but also Britain, China, America, Japan, and USSR. He then is able to connect and interlock these facts.

 Michael Hickey asserts that the 1950s was yet a time of conservatism, characterized by key aspects such as limited government, anti-utopianism, traditional religion, free-market economics, and anticommunism. Hickey notes that Truman administration cold-war liberals, led by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, took a different view of South Korea’s fate. Amid the situation where Eastern Europe had already fallen to the Soviets, Berlin barely survived a Soviet blockade, and now North Korea had invaded the South, the Korean War prompted Truman to establish “far-flung American base structure abroad and a national security state at home, as defense spending nearly quadrupled in the last six months of 1950, and turned the United States into the policeman of the world.”12 Also Hickey, championing a revisionist interpretation of the origins of the Korean War – the notion that American came to rescue a victim menaced by malevolent Communists -, portrays raw political reality. According to him, American leaders have consistently blackened North Korea’s reputation rather than promoting true liberal ideals and everlasting peace.
​ In conclusion, the Korean War was the first test of Western military resolve against a Communist nation and the first military operation to be launched by the United Nations. It was colored with many aspects, such as nations' ambitious motives of expansion, sophisticated advances in military, and complicated historical context.

Footnotes:

1. Hickey, Michael. The Great Contraction: 1929-1933. Princeton: Princeton Press, 2007. 11.

2. Hickey, Michael. 8

3. Hickey, Michael. 149

4. Hickey, Michael. 337

5. Hickey, Michael. 355

6. Hickey, Michael. Preface. X.

7. Hickey, Michael. 7

8. Hickey, Michael. 11

9. Alerstein, David. Website

10. Stout, Rob. Website

11. Hickey, Michael. Postcript. 361

12. Hickey, Michael. 91

​

A review of Louis Joseph Halle’s The Cold War as History

In The Cold War as History by Louis J. Halle, the author takes an evenhanded, highly objective stance on the Cold War despite his status inside the government. He makes it clear that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was toblame for the Cold War, but both nations were merely trying to protect their national security and “restore the European balance of power.” Throughout the book, Halle conveys his belief that the Cold War was an ideological war over the balance of power in which the United States gave up its isolationist policy in order to contain the spread of Russian Communism and protect national security. With highly sophisticated language and a sophisticated thesis, Halle takes a realistic and extensively fact-based perspective on the Cold War.

 Halle begins the book by explaining Russia’s vulnerability and lack of natural defenses. Prior to World War II, Germany was the nation that balanced the power of Russia, but after the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Russia became the power vacuum that enveloped half of Europe. Halle states, “the decision to eliminate German power from Europe, rather than make…peace, is what laid the foundations of the Cold War” and enabled Russia to swallow up large amounts of territory. England then took Germany’s place as the balancing power due to its navalstrength, but as England encountered a harsh winter and an economic downturn, the United States took up England’s role as mediator. Halle conveys the idea that Russia’s centralized system of government, conspiratorial foreign relations, distrust of the outside world, and obsession with espionage and secrecy established a nation that was the antithesis of America, thus fueling suspicion and distrust between the two nations. Given these circumstances, Halle establishes his theory that the Cold War was an ideological war over the balance of power in which the United States gave up its isolationist policy in order to contain Russian communism.

As the Cold War escalated in 1950, the fight between communism and American democracy went global.  The ideological differences between Communists and Democrats spread to Berlin and China, and transformed the non-militant disagreement over politics into a nuclear weapons buildup.

 Because the Soviets saw capitalism as a potential detriment to their country, they strayed away from democratic policies, furthering Western suspicion of their intentions. The United States, on the other hand, believed that the Soviet Union was a dangerous country that planned to dominate the world and spread communism, and by this “self-perpetuating dialectic…the Cold War grew rapidly in magnitude and intensity.” The Cold War manifested itself not only in the arms race between the United States and Russia, but also the contest between liberal democracy and communism. Berlin became the center of tension in the Cold War, the symbolic powder keg in which the conflicting ideologies nearly exploded into almost a full-on nuclear war. In June 1948, Russia began the Berlin Blockade in which the Soviets attempted to block the resources of the United States, France, and Great Britain, challenging the West with what appeared to be its weakness. However, the West retaliated with the Berlin Airlift, shipping food and supplies to Berlin over the Soviet’s blockade, demonstrating “Western determination and competence” and humiliating the Soviet Union. By May 1949, Moscow called off the blockade in order to preserve Soviet dignity, and the West triumphed in its first conflict in Berlin. The Cold War exploded in Berlin because it was a microcosm of the global political situation and the Berlin Airlift illustrated the intensity of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Had the United States used military force in Berlin, the world would have been on the brink of World War III, but the strength of nuclear weapons and their potential detriment deterred both the United States and the Soviet Union from using them. The newly partitioned Berlin represented the division between Communists and the West, and this conflict of ideologies would escalate again in the Far East.

For years, the United States was the protector of China: through the Open Door Notes, the United States took up a moral duty to protect China from imperialist countries. However, when Mao Zedong took over with his Communist doctrine in 1949, the United States remained loyal to the old regime—Chiang Kai-shek’s Government of China—a decision that bound the United States to a “sinking ship.” Despite his efforts, President Truman maintained loyalty to the old Chinese system and did not recognize Mao’s Communist regime; however, by not acknowledging this new nation, the situation fell victim to the self-fulfilling prophecy. The United States drove China into the hands of Communism by refusing to deal with the new system and labeling the new regime as Communist, creating more tension between the United States and China, and also eliminating any opportunity for peaceful coexistence. This situation intensified American determination to defeat Moscow, culminating in American involvement in the Korean War. Due to American military neglect of South Korea, Moscow saw Korea as a convenient territory to add to its empire. On June 24, 1950, North Korea launched an armed invasion of South Korea. The United States felt obligated to aid Democratic South Korea, and was victorious in repelling North Korean invasions until the American government wished to unite Korea under one completely Democratic regime. If the United States invaded North Korea, China would intervene, and because the United States was not willing to take this risk, the war was left at a stalemate and the border remained at the 38th parallel as it was before the war. Illustrated by the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, the conflict between the United States and Communism spilled over into world affairs, dividing the globe into two halves.

Because the Cold War grew to encompass the entire globe, Nikita Khrushchev, the new leader of the Soviet Union, took steps to create peace between Russia and the United States. However, despite moments of peace and détente in the 1950s to 1960s, the Cold War would not end until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was a demonstration of civility and moderation in the Cold War that encouraged temporary peaceful coexistence. When Russia launched Sputnik and gained a lead with their I.C.B.M.’s, the sudden technological innovations resolved Russia’s insecurity, however, these innovations also led to the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union, demonstrating an encore of increased tensions. Fortunately, in the Summit of 1960, tension was relieved when Khrushchev’s visit to America ended the Cold War in principle. Because the United States and Russia had independent nuclear weapons, Halle believes they had a “bond of common interest.” In its entirety, the Cold War was a series of misconceptions further fueled by the ideological differences and paranoid suspicion between the United States and the Soviet Union. Halle conveys the message that both sides of the war demonized the other party and that the West was “acting in its own legitimate defense rather than in a spirit of aggression.” The sudden expansion of Russia sparked conflict, and the ideological differences created suspicion. Given the situation, nuclear power was a double-edged sword—both creating possible annihilation of nations, and also deterring any major destruction from occurring.

Throughout the book, Halle establishes his thesis that Russia was the victim of aggression and Stalin was a politician rather than a Marxist dogmatic. Because of Russia’s lack of natural defenses, it was necessary for the nation to engage in defensive expansion, thus leading Russia to envelop half of Europe in 1945 and snatch the attention of United States foreign policies. The original Russians were “defenseless on all sides,” leaving their civilizations vulnerable to the vicious nations around them, thus Russia adopted a secretive policy inspired by the hysteric paranoia surrounding the nation’s national security. This defensive expansion led Russia to become the power vacuum after the crippling of Germany and by 1945 Russia had grown to envelop almost half of Europe. Russia’s rapid expansion upset European balance of power, but because the European powers were so weak after the devastating Second World War, the United States had to take over the role ofthe mediating power. The Cold War was, in its entirety, a fight to restore a balance of power; the ideological differences between the two nations only heightened the conflict. Halle believes Stalin did not intend for Russia to become the power vacuum, but it was “almost impossible to disengage” Russia’s sudden inheritance of territory. He implies that the blame placed on Moscow and Communism was not valid and that the sudden expansion of Russian territory was not premeditated, but rather a national reaction to widespread desires for peace and security after the Second World War.Vast ideological differences between Communism and the West only fueled the suspicion and misconceptions that flew back and forthbetween the two sides, and complicated the simple desire for balance of power. Halle ultimately maintains the idea that both sides of the war were neither innocent nor guilty of starting the Cold War, but merely parts of the whole situation, parts that were steered by the dynamics of the aftermath of a devastating world war.

Louis J. Halle was a member of the State Department from 1941 to 1954 who dealt with Inter-American affairs from 1946 to 1951, and a member of the Policy Planning staff from 1952 to 1954. Despite the fact that Halle was a close friend of Kennan, who was at the center of the Cold War and its affairs and the inventor of the principle of containment, Halle is not impartial to the United States. In fact, because of this relationship, Halle is able to eloquently express the United States’ policy of containment, and other actions the United States took to try to isolate Communism. Halle takes a psychological approach to the reasoning behind Russia’s radically different government policies and reaches the conclusion that the Cold War was not a war between good and evil, but merely a war to restore a balance of power. His perspective was radical for his time period, because the Cold War was still in progress in 1967 when The Cold War as History was published, but Halle wrote this book in order to give the public an objective perspective from an educated point of view. A Harvard graduate, former member of the American government, and close friend of Kennan—the creator of containment—Halle is a Cold War expert. He uses his knowledge to express his opinion of the Cold War and its implications, yet maintains a highly objective point of view while doing so to make sure his book reflects reality rather than propaganda. He favors neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, and decides that neither side is to blame for sparking the conflict. Because Halle published the book in 1967, a period of détente, he believed the Cold War was over, however, the Cold War did not truly end until 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Halle’s highly detached, realistic rendering of Cold War affairs led his book to be widely read not only in the 1960s, but also to be an excellent resource today.

Although The Cold War as History may be a realistic view of the Cold War, it is not free from flaws. D.F. Fleming weighed the pros and cons of Halle’s perspective and coverage of information in his book review. He mentions that Halle did not mention much about the later years of the League of Nations after World War I and how “the United States removed the [military] that was necessary to keep the peace.” Fleming believed this was an essential facet of the beginnings of the Cold War, and explains how crucial it is that Halle should have covered it in his book. Despite this absence of information, Fleming still commends Halle for his high level of objectivity in his rendering of the events of the Cold War, and praises his analysis of the Truman Doctrine as an “effort to establish a Pox Americana all around the globe.” Overall, Fleming believes Halle’s book is an excellent, realistic description of the Cold War, and that Halle does an excellent job relating the implications of the war to everyday society and future necessities for peace by establishing his theory that the world’s destiny depends “on balance of power manipulations.”

Louis J. Halle does maintain an independent, impartial take on the Cold War, and has extensive information and understanding on the events, causes, and hysteria surrounding the Cold War. He supplies the reader with extensive information both inside and outside the war, painting an illustrative backdrop while filling the reader’s mind with a plethora of facts and implied theories that enable the reader to create his or her own opinion while maintaining an educated perspective. Illustrating his objective attitude, he strongly and convincingly conveys the principle that neither Russia nor the United States is to blame for the outbreak of the Cold War. He believes the Cold War “has its own dynamics” and the United States and Russia were merely victims of misconception and paranoia, thus leading to an ideological conflict that was largely an effort to restore the balance of power that existed before the First and Second World Wars. Ultimately, his thesis is an objective yet sophisticated analysis of the Cold War, condensing the numerous events into one single principle that encompasses the motives of both nations: restoring the balance of power, and ensuring the national security of both sides of the war. Louis J. Halle’s perspective towards the Cold War proves useful to not only clear the minds of the confused public during the 1960s, but also to givethe modern reader an objective insight into the Cold War.

With respect to the bigger picture, the 1950s wasa time in which the world powers were primarily trying to protect the status quo and maintain a balance of power. Halle’s entire thesis is centered on the theory that the Cold War was motivated by adesire for national security and a balance of power, not on aggression and changing territories and ideologies. As the author reiterates in his book, the United States was reacting to Russian expansion only to maintain “European balance of trade” and keep the world peaceful rather than pick a fight with a world power. Although the Cold War was fought primarily to maintain the balance of powers, ideological differences and misconceptions complicated the simple dispute, and turned the United States and Russia’s small disagreement into a large phenomenon that threatened nuclear war. Although the main motive was to maintain stasis, some progress was involved in achieving this long-term goal. For example, nuclear powers were developed and opened up potential for the mass obliteration of countries. This technological development both helped intensify the war, yet kept the war at a calm stalemate. The potential dangers of nuclear weapons caused an atmosphere of mass hysteria, fear and high tension, yet the detriment the nuclear weapons could incur inhibited the United States and Russia from taking any military action against one another. While the bigger-picture goal was to ideally restore the peaceful balance in the world, a certain level ofmilitary progress was required to achieve this goal.

In conclusion, Halle objectively describes the Cold War as a fight to recreate a balance of power in Europe. The “ideological element” that inevitably surfaced during the war only intensified the conflict by raising suspicion and complicating the simple desire for peaceful coexistence. Neither side was to blame for instigating the war: each was only protecting their respective need for national security and the desire for peace.

Footnotes:
1.Halle, Louis. The Cold War as History. New York. Harper & Row Publishers, 1967. 2.

2.Halle, Louis. 36.

3.Halle, Louis. 156.

4.Halle, Louis. 165.

5.Halle, Louis. 198.

6.Halle, Louis. 198.

7.Halle, Louis. 416.

8.Halle, Louis. 14.

9.Halle, Louis. 49.

10.Fleming, D.F.. When Did the Cold War Begin? January 8, 1968. The Nation. 54.

11.Fleming, D.F.. 55.

12.Fleming, D.F.. 55.

13.Halle, Louis. The Cold War as History. New York. Harper & Row Publishers, 1967.

Xii.

14.Halle, Louis. 2.

15.Halle, Louis. 3.

​

A review of David Nichols’s Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis:Suez and the Brink of War

The Suez Crisis, also known as the Tripartite Aggression, was a controversial event in history that affects America’s relationship with Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries to this day. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the president of the United States from 1953 to 1962, felt obligated to have the United States mediate the Suez Crisis to avoid a global war. “Called once again to be [the world’s] peacekeeper,”1 President Eisenhower constantly experienced stressful nights as he struggled to appease all parties involved. In addition, President Eisenhower was affected with physical complications which would have the nation trembling with fear that his death would come at any time. President Eisenhower’s physical condition only proved to be a burden to the United States but a boon to already troublesome nations looking for weaknesses as signs to wage war. Despite all of this, President Eisenhower displayed immense courage and remarkable persistence; he professionally handled this crisis and secured a safer future for the United States.

Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis-Suez and the Brink of War starts by describing the Suez Crisis, which took place during the Cold War and involved several nations across the globe. The Suez Crisis started when 80,000 British troops entered their colony of Egypt and established a base in the Suez Canal zone, much to the disappointment of the Egyptians. The invasion of the British troops delayed the Egyptians’ plans to build the Aswan dam on the Nile River,. In addition, several French armies were in Egypt, prompting Egypt to begin negotiations for the withdrawal of the British and French. With all this tension present, the threats of a destructive global war ran high; several nations had stockpiles of nuclear weapons which could wipe out numerous people in one hit, and the whole world watched in fear of a potential nuclear war. President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, managed foreign policy and played a key role in the United States relations with the rest of the world during this time. In addition, President Eisenhower worked to secure the United States’ welfare by maintaining involvement in the National Security Council . Meanwhile, a $54.6 million grant was pledged to assist the first stage of construction for the Aswan Dam in Egypt, which would be built on the Nile River. Aside from these events were chaos and the threat of a nuclear war, as well as the lingering question of President Eisenhower’s reelection. Doctors worried that President Eisenhower should “go a bit slowly than to rush the completion of [his] convalescence.”2 However, persistence prevailed, and President Eisenhower kept fighting the odds.

 The book continues by explaining President Eisenhower’s temperament and his belief that physical restrictions were meaningless when it came to carrying out his duties. He was faced with many daunting tasks, including counteracting Soviet schemes and urging Britain to resolve oil conflicts with Saudi Arabia. Overall, however, Eisenhower emphasized “promoting mutual confidence…among the nations”3 as a way to establish a sense of global security. These feelings were crucial because anti-Nasser feelings were rising, with the United States seeking to punish Nasser, prime minister of Egypt. Nations called for “non-military projects and enterprises” and the maintenance of access to oil. However, tensions continue to rise when Egypt found out about the United States’ aid to Israel. The Egyptian military organized Operation Alert, a mobilization exercise in which 97 nukes were to be dropped over 52 major American cities. These plans were evidently Egypt’s strategies in case of a war in the future, and President Eisenhower responded by strengthening the security of the United States. Despite these tumultuous circumstances, Congress agreed on a foreign aid appropriation for the Middle East.

 As the Suez Crisis gradually worsened, the United States pursued a twofold approach to it. One part of the approach aimed to broaden the base of nations involved in the crisis, while the other part sought to separate ownership of the canal from Egypt.. Additionally, plans to drive Nasser out of Egypt were being proliferated. Nations pondered the question of whether Britain and France would be justified in taking military action if Nasser refused to accept a reasonable proposal regarding the canal. However, President Eisenhower firmly stated that the United States would not participate in war unless Congress declared it. Efforts were made to curb British plans for military action, and soon, plans made earlier to overthrow Nasser dissipated. However, suspicions arose once more when Nasser announced he would not attend the London conference, which was an important meeting where several negotiations were to be held. Evidently, the tensions regarding Nasser were still present. Meanwhile, Israel, Britain, and France planned to launch a full-scale attack on Egypt. Soon, heavy fighting began in Egypt with invasions by Israeli forces; this prompted Eisenhower to swear in response to “defend any nation that was a victim of aggression.”4 Things were looking bleak as Israeli attacks on Egypt impacted vital European oil supplies.

 The dispute over how to handle the British-French invasion force continued, with the United States assuring condemnation of British, French, and Israeli aggressors. Further issues arose regarding the Soviet Union’s Space Program and the prospect of imposing a blockade against Israel. The United States’ economy also forced President Eisenhower to reconsider the nation’s existing programs of assistance to Israel. A cease-fire was sought after at this point, as several people were tired of the crisis. In addition, Khrushchev of the Soviet Union managed satellite states, Syrians blew up British oil pipelines, and world peace started to seem more and more like an impossible ideal to achieve. Fortunately, Britain and France agreed to a cease-fire before pandemonium exploded, granted that Egypt and Israel were willing to accept the insertion of a UN force on the border between the two. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was intent on controlling the nation of Hungary- a country that was having an influx of people from other countries; in addition to this, people from other countries were pouring into Hungary’s borders. In response, an infuriated President Eisenhower turned his full and undivided attention towards Hungary, stating “[I] have given [my] whole thought to Hungary and the Middle East. I don’t give a damn how the election goes.”5 Efforts began to assemble a peacekeeping force against malicious Soviet intentions. There was no doubt that all of this turmoil required immense psychological and physical strength to endure, as President Eisenhower was well aware that if his plans failed, the Middle East could descend into chaos. Evidently concerned about restoring global peace, Eisenhower made plans accordingly. In 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was established, which allowed a Middle Eastern country to request American economic assistance or aid from United States military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. Soviet threats still existed but were not as big of a problem anymore, and the situation in Hungary was coming under control. Financial assistance was also given to Britain after the Suez Crisis. Also, Nasser thanked the United States for help during the 1956 aggression towards Egypt after the crisis ended.

Nichols, in addition to giving plenty of factual information on the Suez Crisis, makes it clear in his thesis that the United States was wrongfully deceived by Britain and France in the Suez Crisis; because of this deception, the United States under the leadership of the President Eisenhower was justified in taking appropriate action in response. President Eisenhower was actively involved in resolving the crisis, and his “historic contribution following the Suez crisis was the commitment of the United States to maintaining the stability and security of the Middle East.”6 President Eisenhower’s role in the crisis was vital to the successful results, and Nichols strongly believes that without Eisenhower, a global war would have certainly followed the crisis. Nichols also believes that Eisenhower was very skilled in dealing with the situation because Eisenhower’s president successors, “[had] not been notably successful in stabilizing the region or resolving its most fractious controversies.”7

One factor that may have influenced Nichols’ point of view in this work is his education. He acquired a Ph.D. from William and Mary College, a very reputable college that proves his education’s credibility. David Nichols was also a former professor and academic dean at Southwestern College. In addition to writing Eisenhower 1956: The President’s ear of Crisis-Suez and the Brink of War, Nichols is the author of A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution as well as Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy and Politics.8 He specializes in analyzing and writing about the Eisenhower presidency, but also studies the events that took place during Abraham Lincoln’s presidency. Unfortunately, not much is known about Nichols’ beliefs, opinion, nationality, or childhood. However, as someone who lived through the era of the Eisenhower presidency and Suez Crisis, Nichols was an eyewitness to the Suez Crisis in 1956; this is first-hand knowledge that maximized his understanding of the topic and gave his work additional validity.

Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis-Suez and the Brink of War has also been critically reviewed. One book review from the “Air & Space Power Journal” gives a unique positive evaluation on the book. The review summarizes the Suez Crisis event and states that Nichols challenges the reader to try and fathom how “so many critical events occurred in such a short period of time and found their way to Eisenhower’s shoulders.”9 President Eisenhower’s strong-willed character was evident during the Suez Crisis, and the book review appreciates President Eisenhower’s perseverance during his weakened health state. The book review also reminds the reader that President Eisenhower was still an ordinary man, and his position of president did not make him any more physically capable of carrying out tasks than anyone else. In addition, President Eisenhower maintained a professionally calm and collected outwards appearance by masking all personal and sentimental emotions; he coped with stress by venting in private, and by doing so, he prevented negative emotions from interfering with his job. The review continually praises the book as an informative work full of valuable information, in addition to appreciating the fact that Nichols provides up-to-date facts from his research of diaries and logs. Additionally, the book review reflects the general public’s expression of admiration towards President Eisenhower’s character. On the other hand, while the review recognizes that there is solid evidence and factual information in the work, it notes that “Nichols leaves room for…musings and questions.”10 As a result, the reader is prompted to use critical thinking and a deeper level of insight to draw their own conclusions and opinions on the topic.  The book review sees this technique as instrumental to the reader’s sense of inclusion in the story, which ultimately leads to an immersive experience.. Overall, the critical review states that Nichols’ book is a great source of information on the Suez Crisis that avoids bias.

In addition, Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis-Suez and the Brink of War was truly an enjoyable read for various reasons. Not only does the book offer a considerable amount of knowledge on the Suez Crisis, but it also allows readers to “personally encounter” President Eisenhower and learn about him on a deeper level than they would from just reading out a social science textbook. The structure of the book was efficient; it explained the several events of the Suez Crisis in chronological order while adding commentary on President Eisenhower’s involvement and actions. The book described the cause of the Suez Canal Crisis in a way that leads the reader to agree with Nichols that Britain and France are largely responsible for starting the crisis. Nichols describes that tensions were hostile, yet Eisenhower did his best to remain calm and handle the situation professionally and rationally. Readers would appreciate that President Eisenhower had “given…[his] own personal conviction, as well as that of [his] associates, as to the unwisdom even of contemplating the use of military force at [that] moment.”11 President Eisenhower handled the situation very peacefully, as he was doing his best to avoid conflict, which could lead to a devastating turn of events in the future. Nichols effectively engages the reader’s interest in the book by adding personal events of President Eisenhower’s life in between chunks of text giving information strictly on the Suez Crisis. Because of this, a deeper understanding is able to be gained as to why Eisenhower made some of the decision he did, and what some of his desires were driven by. Overall, Nichols’ work not only teaches a very interesting event in history, but it also allows readers to embark on a thought-provoking journey full of insight and discoveries.

Although the 1950’s was a multifaceted time with both notions of liberalism and conservatism, Nichols’ work argues that it was primarily a time of conservatism and stasis. The 1950s was a time generally known for its widespread conformity after WWII. David Nichols would agree with President Eisenhower’s decision to avoid a war that could possibly devastate the United States. Although a few individuals, like U.K. Prime Minister Eden, “argued that ‘prompt forcible action’ was essential,”12, President Eisenhower stood firm to his ground and had no problem opposing Prime Minister Eden’s viewpoint. This backs up the notion that the 1950s was a time of conservatism, as President Eisenhower’s decision to pursue a peaceful policy is nowhere nearly as radical as a liberal plan. While President Eisenhower opposed war as an option to turn to first in a time of conflict because “the power of modern weapons made war not only perilous-but preposterous,”13, he was eventually forced to turn to fighting after several offenses by the British and French. All in all, David Nichols argues that the 1950s was anything but a liberal time period, and the events during this time pertaining to the Suez Crisis proved a stasis in point of time, rather than a period of progression.

Evidently, the Suez Canal Crisis was a chaotic event in history, and quite unnecessary as many argue it could have been avoided entirely. While tensions remained after the crisis was over, the main conflict was for the most part resolved, and no nation looked forward to being involved anymore. Diplomatic relations were altered by this event, and different nations viewed each other differently from then on. Eisenhower effectively maintained the stability and security of the Middle East,”14 and his achievements would change not only history, but also the security and well-being of the world.

Footnotes:

Nichols, David A. Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis: Suez and the Brink of War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011. Print.

Nichols, David A. 44.

Nichols, David A. 83.

Nichols, David A. 214.

Nichols, David A. 238.

Nichols, David A. 286.

Nichols, David A. 286.

"Booknoise.net | David A. Nichols." Booknoise.net | David A. Nichols. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 June 2014.

Menza, Maj Thomas F. "Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis-Suez and the Brink of War." Air & Space Power Journal (November-December 2012): 178-81. Print.

Menza, Maj Thomas F. 181.

Nichols, David A. 133.

Nichols, David A. 143.

Nichols, David A. 216.

Nichols, David. A. 286.

​

 A review of Michael Beschloss’s Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair

On May 1, 1960, an American plane was shot down inside the Soviet border. No one could predict the consequences.  Americans believed that the plane would disintegrate and the pilot would die.  No one would foresee that not only would the plane remain intact, but also the pilot would be alive and well.  In Michael R. Beschloss’ historical analysis Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair, the incident that brought an end to détente isexamined under a microscope.  The downing of the U-2 plane and the debacle that ensued convinced many Americans that “their leaders did not always tell them the truth.”1

 Beschloss’ book begins with a prologue detailing the conditions inside the White House leading up to the destruction of the U-2 plane.  Even though he repeatedly “[scrutinized] the red-blue-green route maps spread across his big desk, Eisenhower had ordered the CIA to fly deep into Soviet airspace.”2 Although Eisenhower opposed crossing the Soviet border and sending an espionage plane into the depths of the red nation, he understood that the United States needed information from inside the highly secretive nation.  The book also details how America and the Soviet Union had warming relations.  Both Eisenhower and Khrushchev didn’t want to expend more resources to fight meaningless battles.  Following the prologue, Beschloss shifts his focus to the life of Francis Gary Power, the pilot inside the infamous U-2 that was shot down.  “Born two months before the Stock Market Crash of 1929 in the coal country of Burdine, Kentucky,” he became a pilot for the United States Air Force and later, the CIA.3 Before his infamous trip, he was taught several maneuvers   to ensure that all evidence of American espionage would be destroyed before the Soviets could get their hands on classified information.  Should a plane be shot down Powers was supposed to flip the destruction switches that detonate the plane destroying all evidence that the Americans were spying on the Soviets. Unfortunately, when Powers’ plane was shot down, Powers only worried about his own life and escaped without destroying the plane.  Back in Washington D.C. Eisenhower worried over the flak that would come as a result of the U-2 plane being shot down in Soviet airspace, but the CIA assured the president that it would have been impossible for the Soviets to capture a live pilot.  What they didn’t know was that Francis Gary Powers had successfully ejected from the U-2 and was alive and well in Soviet custody.  Beschloss then shifts to the process behind Eisenhower’s decision to deny American espionage activity in the USSR.  Eisenhower’s decision was difficult to make because Khrushchev had decided to withhold the fact that the pilot had lived.  Khrushchev’s “intention was to confuse the government circles of the United States.  As long as the Americans thought the pilot was dead, they would keep putting out the story that perhaps the plane had accidentally strayed off-course and been shot down in the mountains on the Soviet side of the border.”4  Surely enough, NASA and Eisenhower came out with statements claiming that the missing U-2 plane had accidentally veered over the Soviet border after the pilot lost consciousness due to lack a of oxygen. While Eisenhower and NASA told blatant lies, Francis Gary Powers revealedthe truth: he was sent to spy over Soviet land.  Luckily for the Americans, Khrushchev genuinely believed Eisenhower desired peace: “I am quite willing to grant that the President knew nothing about the fact that such a plane was sent into the Soviet Union… But this should put us even more on guard,” said Khrushchev5 Following his explanation of Eisenhower’s process in handling the downing of the plane, Beschloss’ focus shifts to the roots of Eisenhower’s and Khrushchev’s power.  The reader learns of Eisenhower military background and his predilections about the increasing the strength of a peacetime army.  During his presidential campaign he was insistent on the fall of the iron curtain but refused to use armed forces.  After Stalin died, Soviet rhetoric suddenly became friendly and calls were made for an American-Soviet peace.  John Foster Dulles, a presidential advisor, warned the President against Russia’s “phony peace campaign”, but the president felt that it was time for the Americans and Soviets to build mutual trust.6This was hard to do considering that the Soviets had spies in America, and the Americans couldn’t send their spies, due to the Soviet’sextreme secrecy.  To gather information, Edwin Land, an inventor and scientist, proposed of flying planes over Soviet airspace.  Initially, Eisenhower approved of plans to fly near and occasionally over the Soviet border in order to take pictures of objectives.  The CIA was then given the duty to create a plane that flew too high for Soviets to shoot down.

 The steps leading to the creation of the U-2 flights are detailed in the second quarter of the book.  Both Russians and Americans met to discuss a possibility of opening all airspace for all nations to traverse, but Khrushchev wasn’t open to the idea of Americans flying over Soviet airspace.  He felt that the Soviet Union had nothing to gain by opening their skies for the Americans.  The Soviets could already fly over America since it was a free country.  Following Khrushchev’s refusal to grant free airspace, Eisenhower allowed the CIA to operate the U-2 planes in the Soviet Union.  Prior to sending U-2s into the line of fire, the CIA sent balloons equipped with cameras disguised as weather balloons to scout the country looking for key regions for the U-2s to fly over.  Beschloss then shifts to Eisenhower’s re-election campaign and his unwillingness to have Richard Nixon as a running partner. Covert missions to infiltrate Soviet infrastructure went back to Berlin, where agents “tapped the telephone lines from London to Leipzig.  Western agents sat inside the narrow passage far underground, listening in on conversations about the Soviet order of battle and the location of Soviet troops.”7  Though the Soviets uncovered the earliest CIA missions, American media lauded the government’s audacity in undertaking bold maneuvers. But even after the American failure in Berlin, Khrushchev still maintained his faith in Eisenhower’s peacekeeping efforts.  Betraying Khrushchev’s optimism, Eisenhower continued to approve ofU-2 flights over Soviet land. Despite all espionage efforts, U-2s still couldn’t find any evident of Soviet missiles even as late as 1960.

 A shift of peaceful policies occurred when Khrushchev addressed all of Europe.  As U-2 flights continued to scour over Soviet land, Khrushchev threatened all of Europe and the United States.  He declared that if the westerners would not leave West Berlin, he would allow Easterners access into the small capital of West Berlin.  The West refused to give in to his demands.  Eisenhower, though, invited Khrushchev to America with hopes of improving relations between the Soviets and Americans.  Khrushchev was just as surprised as anyone when he received the invitation: “I couldn’t believe my eyes… We had no reason to expect such an invitation-- not then, or ever, for that matter.”8The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union can best be defined as rosy, especially when Khrushchev raved “United States of America, the greatest capitalist power in the world, bestows honor on the representative of our socialist homeland.”9 Eisenhower’s plan in inviting Khrushchev to America was to inform him that not only did the government want peace; the entire nation did as well. At Camp David, the site where Eisenhower and Khrushchev met, negotiations led to much warmer relations between the United States and Soviet Union. Khrushchev did not mention the U-2s.  Once Khrushchev returned to the Soviet Union, US-Soviet tensions continued to decrease as Khrushchev proposed cuts the Soviet military by 12 million soldiers.  Though he was irked, Khrushchev never expressed his discontent towards Eisenhower’s approval of spy missions.  Surprisingly, when it was revealed that Francis Gary Powers was indeed alive, and that Eisenhower and NASA lied, Eisenhower refused to shift the blame to anyone, even though there were many willing to take the flak.  As a result, Khrushchev felt betrayed by Eisenhower.

 As the leaders of the major powers gathered, the world hoped for improved relations and increased chances of peace.  The Paris summit meeting was guaranteed failure because the two greatest powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had tense relations.  Eisenhower, Khrushchev, de Gaulle, and Macmillan, leaders of the US, USSR, France, and Britain respectively discussed the state of Europe, but ultimatelycould not come to a consensus.  In the end, both the Soviets and the Americans blamed each other for the failure of the Paris summit meeting.  Meanwhile, American senators began an investigation of the U-2 and the failed summit.  Senators like Mike Mansfield hoped to find out how such an embarrassment could come about.  Meanwhile, the CIA continued to build planes that could follow the U-2.  On July 1, an American RB-47 spy plane left London and flew towards the northern coast of the Soviet Union, where it was shot down by the Soviets.  Tensions flared as Khrushchev denounced the Americans’ peaceful rhetoric: “Eisenhower’s pledge to stop the spy flights was ‘not worth a busted penny.’”10  The détente that was once within grasp shattered as both sides exchanged ultimatums.  In Russia, Soviet courts condemned Francis Gary Powers to fifteen years in prison, Powers stood up and said, “I plead to the court to judge me not as an enemy, but as a human being.”11(334)  When Francis Gary Powers was finally released from Soviet custody, America was divided.  Some saw him as a traitor; others saw him as a hero.In the end, both the US and the Soviet Union were responsible ending of détente.  With Eisenhower’s bold in strategies and Khrushchev’s lack of communication, both sides acted without consequences.  The leaders were duly criticized.

 The author’s thesis states that the U-2 Affair compromised détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.  In the final paragraphs of his prologue, he writes of Eisenhower’s final goals as president: “a Soviet-American accord at Paris, the grand tour of Russia and… a Republican victory in November.”12(11)  Beschloss’ thesis revolves around every action made and their subsequent effect.  In a rare footnote, Beschloss specifically defines détente as “the easing of strained relations, especially in political situations.”13(6)  Every time that Eisenhower makes a move that upset Khrushchev, Beschloss keeps the possibility of détente alive by quoting Khrushchev saying how the Soviet leader believed in the true goodness of Eisenhower.  It isn’t until the second to last chapter that he reveals the true consequences of the U-2 missions and the hostile rhetoric between the two groups.  Beschloss focuses his book on the push-pull effect of events on the relationship between the two nations.

 The time period when Beschloss wrote and published his book greatly affects his perspective on Eisenhower. In 1986, Dwight Eisenhower’s public approval rating began to soar with the release of declassified government files.  In Beschloss’ book, there are very few references to Eisenhower’s mistakes as it depicts Eisenhower as an honest politician who sought to protect his own country.  Khrushchev is repeatedly quoted as saying that Eisenhower was a peaceful man who yearned for warmer relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Also, Beschloss published this book at a relatively young age of 31.  The idealism of his youth may have also had an impact on his perspective of Eisenhower.  His American citizenship also creates a bias that favors Eisenhower’s policies. Whenever Eisenhower approved a spy mission, the author focuses on the Soviet reactions.  This emphasis suggests that Khrushchev could have sustained détente, but soiled it with failed strategies.  The idealistic reverence of American leadership and the revival of praise for Eisenhower shifted the tone of the book in favor of Eisenhower’s perspective.  As an example of Eisenhower’s leniency, Beschloss quotes him having said, “I am tired—and I think everyone is tired—of just plain indictments of the Soviet regime.  I think it would be wrong—in fact, asinine—for me to get up before the world now to make another one of those indictments.”14(71)  Even though Eisenhower was largely to blame for the U-2 disaster, Beschlossforgives him. Overall, he writes as if Eisenhower didn’t want to make the decisions that he did.  It certainly followed the trend in the 1980s of an increased love for the president.

 Both Robert D. Sloan and Harry Howe Ransom wrote insightful reviews on Beschloss’ Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair.  Sloan, a former counsel to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, wrote in a Chicago Tribune article praising Beschloss’ “extraordinary verve and drama” and adds that “his book is a pleasure to read.”15 Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University continued to praise Beschloss: “This carefully researched and finely crafted book is a significant addition to our understanding of American diplomatic history and decision making on foreign affairs in a crucial period.”16 These two well-qualified reviewers agree that Michael R. Beschloss’ Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affairis a well-written on the U-2 affair and its consequences.

 Beschloss’ book provides great detail surrounding the U-2 Affair and its consequences.  From the life of Francis Gary Powers to the rise of Nikita Khrushchev, Beschloss tirelessly fills his 494 page book with minute details.  While details involving Eisenhower’s health problems or his treatment of White House advisors may enlighten the reader to understand why his decision making complex, butirrelevant details such as, “Sergeant Moaney’s ritual [of]  holding out boxer shorts for the President,” waste space and interrupt the flow of information.17Beschloss attention to minute facts give the reader massive amounts of information that reader can use to draw his or her own independent conclusions.

 Beschloss argues that the 1950s was a time of conservatism.  Although both Khrushchev and Eisenhower used rhetoric that sometimes seemed liberal, such as Khrushchev’s praise of Eisenhower’s peacekeeping efforts, but their actions showed otherwise.  For example, in 1958, Khrushchev threatened that if the “West did not leave Berlin and sign [a peace treaty] within six months, he would sign a separate peace allowing the East Germans to govern access routes to West Berlin.”18His threat displays the ongoing tension between the Soviets and the West that had been present since the Bolshevik Revolution.  Eisenhower and Khrushchev decreased tensions by limiting their armies and visiting each other’s countries, repeated spy missions into the Soviet Union prove that beneath the rhetoric, the 1950s was a time of continued strife.

 Michael R. Beschloss writes a book that invigorates the mind and makes the reader think.  He exquisitely details the biggest embarrassment in American history, and closely examines the collapse of warm relations between the Soviets and Americans.  The U-2 Affair may have often been overlooked, but Beschlossreveals its great impact on American history.

Footnotes:

1. Beschloss, Michael R. Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. xi.

2. Beschloss, Michael R. 5.

3. Beschloss, Michael R. 18.

4. Beschloss, Michael R. 41.

5. Beschloss, Michael R. 61.

6. Beschloss, Michael R. 71.

7. Beschloss, Michael R. 115.

8. Beschloss, Michael R. 177.

9. Beschloss, Michael R. 189.

10. Beschloss, Michael R. 321.

11. Beschloss, Michael R. 334.

12. Beschloss, Michael R. 11.

13. Beschloss, Michael R. 6.

14. Beschloss, Michael R.71.

15. Sloan, Robert D. "An Insightful Look At The U-2 Affair." Chicago Tribune. N.p., 27 Apr. 1986. Web. 06 June 2014.

16. Ransom, Harry H. The American Historical Review 92.5 (1987): n. pag. Print.

17. Beschloss, Michael R. 3.

18. Beschloss, Michael R. 162.

​

 A review of Ma Guhin’s John Foster Dulles

Michael Guhin wrote John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times as an attempt to clarify many misconceptions about Dulles and his political decisions and his policies while serving as secretary of state. John Foster Dulles is often associated with the “American Way” in his political views related to international events. Growing up in a strict Puritan household, Dulles tried to mix democratic liberalism with Puritan ideals. He had many influences on his political philosophy, as “his entire political philosophy was barred on the premise of the inevitability of change either by peaceful or violent means and a clear concomitant preference for evolutionary progress as contrasted to the status quo and radical change.” 1 After writing his first book The Year of Judgment, he quickly earned recognition and fame in the political world. From a young age, John Foster Dulles became increasingly liberalized in his involvement in national affairs. Dulles was a pragmatic statesman who tried to cultivate better relations with Congress. He believed in the abstraction of man from foreign power. Throughout the 1950s and onward, John Foster Dulles had many encounters pertinent to the international conditions of the United States and had set ideals and motives for each of his actions.

His major encounters with international affairs and relations began during the period of World War I. Dulles held a major position during World War 1 and worked with the chairman of the War Industries Board, Bernard Baruch. He was also invited to attend the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 at Versailles as an adviser to American financial settlements. He was responsible for the economic sections of the treaty with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and took an active interest in the postwar problem of German reparations. John Foster Dulles also held a leading hand as a member of the Reparations Committee and countered the arguments for the inclusion of the war costs, stating that a fixed sum of reparations should be established in the hope of reaching a clean and reasonable reparation settlement. When Dulles returned from the Paris Peace Conference, he gained international respect and was recognized as an American expert on reparations and international finance. One of John Foster Dulles’s main motives was for the United States to ease the debt and burden on Europe. His hope was to free countries such as France, Germany, and Great Britain from any further financial burdens. Dulles was disappointed by the US rejection of membership in the League of Nations because he strongly believed that the League could help solve the financial conflicts many countries were facing together after the war. He had sharp criticisms and emphasized the idea of shared guilt for the war, advocating a shared responsibility by many of the major countries to repay the reparations. Dulles aimed his attacks at the accepted “dictates of the sovereignty system.” 2  From 1939 to 1945, he focused on creating an international organization that favored public opinion and was flexible in meeting the needs of the people. Dulles also was a strong contender of post-war planning and stressed the necessity and importance of it. From 1946 to 1948, President Truman invited Dulles to attend the United Nations General Assembly as an American delegate. Dulles’s nonpartisanships were exemplified in Senate as he adhered to the idea of a more united Europe. Dulles continued in his attempts to spread peace, by publishing his second book, War on Peace. This book had a much more political context than his previous one as it highlighted the various political conflicts from the period of the Cold War. His ultimate motive was to initiate some ideas and methods to bring about peace in the conflicts of the Cold War.

After John Foster Dulles’s first experiences in international affairs, he started to direct his attention to the economic, political, and psychological origins of conflict. He maintained his belief that economic programs and overall cooperation were vital in order for a country to function along with other countries. Dulles stated that “the problem of international peace is but an extension of internal power.” 3 He stressed that peaceful change demanded rule of reason, for “the central concept to Dulles understanding was the inevitability of change. Active movements directed against the status quo, although capable of being interrupted and temporarily dammed up, were ultimately irreversible.” 4 Maintaining a fair balance of power was Dulles’s active principle behind all of his major decisions. He realized that the domestic balance of power and the conceptions and attitudes of the governed people limited the behavior of the government. During World War II, Dulles focused on international organization. His policies were directed against isolationist tendencies and American participation. Dulles felt that national governments should be constantly remodeled and adapted to meet the needs of the world. To him, the post World War II attitudes of the United States seemed to represent substantial shifts from what they once initially were. After the war, the nation had demobilized, and this action reflected the habit of separating military and political considerations within the United States. During the war, Dulles’s position was essentially nationalistic. In hopes of strengthening America’s political and propaganda position, he presented and began to emphasize the practice of “moral law”.

John Foster Dulles was extremely concerned with the fact that neither America nor other countries were effectively meeting the challenges of the war. Dulles “was convinced that the most fatal of defects was by strident of power politics.” 5 This ultimately upset his desired balance of power within the government. Dulles was not trained in dealing with the problems of the Cold War He had to dissociate himself from the Democratic party to retain a position for the Republicans, ultimately in an attempt to maintain the balance of power. Dulles wrote of America’s dilemma as “quasi-partners of Russia.” He was also very concerned with the decisions of the Yalta Conference, highlighting what he considered were the two most important and encouraging signs at Yalta. The first condition was that the United States would remain aloof, and the second was that Russia was willing to discuss postwar problems. In John Foster Dulles’s attempts of trying to interpret the Cold War, he came to the conclusion that Soviet leaders were realistic politicians who would avoid military adventures. Dulles’s postwar pronouncements were designed as methods to bring home the realities of the international difficulties being faced throughout the world. Dulles felt the need for the United States to take on certain responsibilities to aid the war effort. Dulles discovered that recognizing the daily demands of the people actually helped resolve many problems. In 1952, Dulles accepted an invitation to address the French National and Political Science Institute, where he outlined a potential campaign platform for Yalta. Many historians often consider Dulles as “immoral” in his policy of containment. However, the goal of his approach was solely an attempt to achieve peaceful liberation. Dulles had differing views than that of the President during the 1950s. He was “portrayed by the President as one of the group of ‘master minds’ playing cruel gutter politics and risking atomic warfare by influencing Eisenhower to pledge liberation to the nations enslaved by Russia.” 6 In 1952, the question arose of what Dulles’s position was on liberation, and he clarified his position on the subject through the Republican platform.

John Foster Dulles held a leading hand in the politics and diplomacy of secretaryship. During his time, he also brought to attention limitations within the political system. He handled the negotiations and political problems surrounding the ratification of Japanese Peace Treaty and Great Britain. His dealings with foreign policy provided an understanding of his secretaryship and the motives behind his actions. He asserted that the basic concept should be the building of a more unified Europe. Dulles characterized Europe as a firetrap, which is ultimately why he hoped for increased economic and political cooperation both within the United States as well as Europe. He was convinced the evolution of post war Europe would be influenced by United States politics and action. One of the dilemmas Dulles faced with the government because of his differing political views was that “the United States policy became less how to ensure ratification of the EDC, although this renamed a principal aim…and in order either to attain ratification or to get on with working out possible alternatives.” 7 In the Massive Retaliation debate of the 1950s, John Foster Dulles adhered to the broad outlines of the adopted strategy of the United States, leaving room for some flexible capabilities. For example, John Foster Dulles was the first postwar secretary of state who started to think in terms of overall strategy. He also emphasized the need for a selective approach in military power. In an address he made with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), he highlighted the will of the West and tried to further strengthen and motivate NATO. This speech actually served as a message to the American public. Dulles also kept in close contact with Indochina and Russia. He recognized the necessity for different approaches in various regions of the world. In his 1955 address, Dulles referred to the rise of neutralism. His statements on neutrality were easy to ascertain and he outlined the reasons for the US proposed peace.

John Foster Dulles advocated an aggressive stance against communism and enforced his ideals by negotiating several treaties and alliances to limit US involvement in international affairs that would not serve the country’s best interests. He had many set ideals that he refused to compromise under any circumstance. During World War I, he strongly felt that no country should have to face the entire political and economic burden on its own. At the Paris Peace Conference he attempted to distribute the burden so that it would not strain any country. Dulles wanted Europe to start functioning normally again and he believed that this would only be attainable if the United States were to show leniency to Europe. Dulles’s main goal was to improve the international condition while maintaining good international affairs between countries. In regard to issues such as liberation, he “concentrated on areas where there was room for constructive criticism”. 8 Another one of Dulles’s motives was to integrate the opinion of the public in completing political affairs.

Michael Guhin, the author of this book, had earned a PhD in the subject of international politics. His perspective was most likely influenced by his extensive knowledge on the political conditions of many countries during critical times such as war. Guhin has also written other books about international affairs in times of war. For example, he wrote a monograph on US foreign affairs called Nuclear Paradox: Security Risks of the Peaceful Atom. His widespread knowledge on matters such as the atomic bomb could account for his statement that “Dulles was portrayed by the President as one of the group of ‘master minds’ playing cruel gutter politics and risking atomic warfare by influencing Eisenhower to pledge liberation to the nations enslaved by Russia.” 6  This book was written in the 1970s, shortly after the turn of events of many worldwide wars that had taken place. However the Cold War was still going on during this time, a factor that could account for the strong focus on international involvement in wars and the use of bombs.

Norman A. Graebner from the University of London summarizes Guhin’s purpose in writing the book. Although Dulles has often been associated as a negative aspect of US history, this negative connotation has only been linked to him because not enough research or studies were conducted to determine motives behind his actions or any potential plans he had held. Guhin tried to clear up the image of Dulles and defend his actions. Graebner believes that the book “does not fully succeed in carrying out that author’s stated purposes”, but does provide insightful information and analysis on the life and motives of John Foster Dulles. 9 However, it does not seem to be sufficient enough because a majority of the book is just focused on analysis with a minimal amount of factual evidence to support his claims. In his review, Graebner states that although the portrait Guhin paints of Dulles is credible, the argument does not seem to be persuasive as he does not succeed in carrying out his intended purpose in writing the book.

This book provided a great amount of insight on the goals and incentives of John Foster Dulles. It shed new light behind his actions and highlighted many of the speeches and addresses that help develop his motives. The book focuses and deals more with the background of John Foster Dulles and the analysis of his ideas. Although at times the book did seem biased and Guhin constantly attempted to justify Dulles for all of his actions, it was interesting to learn about these international and political affairs from a new light and perspective. In the preface, the author makes the bias clear, stating “the work contains one clear bias: it gives me more pleasure to understand men than to judge them.” 10 John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and his Times provided further history about Dulles and his political philosophy, cleared many misconceptions about Dulles, and was a great asset in learning more about the 1950s.

The 1950s were a time of liberalism and progress. The author of the book, Michael Guhin is able to make a strong defense through the book’s content. He persuasively demonstrates many of the beneficial policies that John Foster Dulles had initially advocated for. Guhin reminds any critics that did not necessarily agree with Dulles of the lessons learned from the Vietnam War in the 1950s - that every secretary of the state becomes “a prisoner of Washington politics, [and] of the prevailing congressional and national moods, of past policies, of international cirumstances.” 11 Dulles found it politically necessary to put up a strong front against communist China in the 1950s. Although at one point Dulles had found neutralism to be “immoral”, he supported the practice of “massive retaliation” and his policies and views were constantly changing throughout the decade.

Michael Guhin’s book, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times, is his attempt to correct what he believes is an “unjust image” painted of John Foster Dulles in American history. His book addresses “those concerned with American foreign policy generally and some of the dilemmas of statesmanship.” 12  By conducting extensive research and study on the life of John Foster Dulles, including the motives and ideals behind his decisions, the reader leaves the book with a better understanding of Dulles and cleared from the misconceptions that the political world has associated him with.

Footnotes:

Guhin, Michael A. John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His times. New York: Columbia UP, 1972. Print. 14.

Guhin, Michael A. 36.

Guhin, Michael A. 93.

Guhin, Micahel A. 61.

Guhin, Michael A. 111.

Guhin, Michael A. 208.

Guhin, Michael A. 172.

Guhin, Michael A. 283.

Guhin, Michael A. 249.

Guhin, Michael A. 98.

Graebner, Norman A. John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and his Times. Columbia University Press, 1972.

12. Guhin, Michael A. 2.

​

 A review of Peter Grose’s Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Wayne G. Jackson once said that “the incarnation of intelligence...would inevitably be Dulles.” 1 This work does not just discuss Allen Dulles’ life as CIA director, it begins by talking about his life before he began his career in the state department, worked as a Wall Street Lawyer, and even became president of the Council of Foreign Affairs. But above all of his many professions, he was a man who dedicated the entirety of his life, efforts, and energy to serving his nation. A riveting history about how collecting intelligence led Dulles into a life of espionage and excitement, Peter Grose’s Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles is a comprehensive biography on the civilian who headed the Central Intelligence Agency from 1953-1963 and was its longest-serving director in the midst of Cold War tensions. Grose’s years of experience in foreign affairs and the state department enabled him to provide insight while writing this book. Even though Allen Dulles was not the first or the best director of the CIA, he was undeniably one of the most instrumental in shaping U.S. foreign policy.

In the first quarter of the book, Peter Grose discusses Allen’s family life and the start of his lasting career in the government. Allen Dulles was born on April 7, 1893 and had two siblings, John Foster Dulles and Eleanor Lansing Dulles; both Allen and his brother John were destined for a future in the government. After enlisting in the New Jersey National Guard  and participating in diplomatic service at the same time, he was eventually discharged, so he focused on staying in diplomatic service. He arrived at his first diplomatic post in Vienna on July 7, 1916. However, his first covert operation was a disaster since many government officials eventually found out about his mission to set up a secret meeting between two high officials. As World War I raged on, the need for collecting information became imperative to protecting national security and so “spying” became a standard term as “the game of intelligence became more professional.” 2 After World War I ended, Germany was in ruins, and both the Dulles brothers were assigned to restore Germany to its former stability. John Foster was in charge of reparations while Allen established a viable intelligence agency and also helped define the borders of the new European state of Czechoslovakia, while addressing problems such as ethnic division, strategic concern, and economic viability. After traveling all over Europe, Allen returned to the U.S. in 1920 and spontaneously proposed to Martha Clover Todd a week after he met her.

Unfortunately “it was not a happy match,” and they scarcely lived together, with Allen often cheating on her; as a result, intelligence became Allen's escape from home life.3 However, on September 22, 1926 he resigned from Foreign Service after ten years of membership because “he could no longer afford to be a professional diplomat,” due to his financial problems and his need to support his growing family.4 Allen then moved to New York and became a lawyer for international business and accepted partnership with Sullivan and Cromwell, a law firm. Soon after, however, he returned to foreign affairs when Norman Davis, president of the Council of Foreign Relations, decided to go to Europe to advertise Sullivan and Cromwell. On this trip, Dulles  even met Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, two men whom he would later work to bring down. As World War II was approaching, Dulles and Ham Armstrong wrote a book called Can America Stay Neutral? and quoted Charles Lindbergh saying America “should never enter a war unless it’s essential.” 5 However, after the bombing at Pearl Harbor, America entered the war and Allen’s life as a Wall Street lawyer was over. After December 7, 1941, Dulles began a career in intelligence.

 Dulles now lived a double life, finding assets for his intelligence network in order to penetrate and bring down Nazi Germany. William Donovan, founder of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), hired Dulles to start a secret OSS unit in New York. However, Dulles was not happy that he had to be home, tied down by his family, while everyone else was going off to war. He then moved to Bern to serve as the American Intelligence Chief in Switzerland. His first months of networking were impressive since he had 25 years of connections to draw upon. Dulles also made more contacts such as Jacobsson, Mckittrick, and Tyler, who were international civil servants that travelled in and out of Nazi Germany and told Dulles everything they observed. After nine months, Allen Dulles “achieved [the] goal of his mission, penetration of the Nazi high command.”6 There was tension within the German army with soldiers who wanted to “arrange a plot against Hitler as an excuse to proclaim martial law,” which led to the start of the Breakers plot.7 The Breakers plot was formed by a group of people who wanted to assassinate Adolf Hitler, and the event was a political turning point in Dulles’s career that made him well-known in Washington. Towards the end of the war, Dulles was involved in the successful Operation Sunrise, which was a series of secret negotiations that made local Nazi forces in northern Italy surrender. However, on December 7, 1945, Allen Dulles resigned from government service and returned to Sullivan and Cromwell. Despite his resignation, the success of Operation Sunrise had established his stature and he was soon elected to be president of the Council of Foreign Relations. The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947, so by the early 1950s it was firmly established as an instrument of the federal government. Although Dulles was not the first director of the CIA, he was still heavily involved. In 1947, he appeared before the United States Senate and said that “the objectives of intelligence are not solely strategic or military...they are scientific.”8 He thought that the CIA should have two parts, the “collection of intelligence and the use of intelligence networks covertly,” and thus, Dulles started to “design the intelligence he would like to take on as his own, someday soon.” 9

 Dulles worked alongside Thomas Dewey against Harry Truman in the presidential campaign of 1948. However, Truman was elected, and so Dulles’s plans for the CIA were now under his former opponent’s approval. After surveying the CIA for a year, Dulles and his colleagues wrote the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report, which “had a long lasting impact on the organization of the intelligence service,” and discussed the failure of the CIA during its first year.10 In 1948, the National Security Council drafted the NSC 10/2, heeding Dulles’ advice to create a special group for covert missions within the CIA to fight communism; meanwhile, Dulles himself entered the CIA in 1951 and became part of the Office of Special Operations and Covert Action.When Eisenhower asked Bendell Smith to leave the CIA to become the Undersecretary of the State, Allen Dulles became the new director of the Central Intelligence Agency and this became known as the “Dulles Era” of the CIA. The threat of communism, however, was growing and so NSC-68 was drafted to enforce the idea that the containment of communism should be the highest priority. Local unrest affected Americans because they thought it had “origins in the vicious machinations of international communism.” 11 An important operation during the Dulles Era was Operation Ajax, a coup to overthrow the Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddegh. Although the mission was proclaimed to be involved because of the “communist threat,” it was actually because of the oil interests. Simultaneously, new technology was being developed, allowing better, faster ways of acquiring intelligence; for example the U-2 plane, which made its first test flight on August 1, 1955.

“The Communist world was still in a state of political turmoil three years after Stalin’s death,” but Nikita Khrushchev soon took over as leader of Soviet Russia.12 When Khrushchev gave a speech to the citizens of the Soviet Union, the CIA eventually got fragments of it three weeks later and they made strong arguments so that it could be published so that everyone could read it. In another part of the world, Operation Hike in Indonesia was underway, a “deliberate campaign of psychological insecurity, followed by contrived military uprising,”  in hopes of bringing down the leader, Sukarno, who had started to favor the communist ideology.13 Although the CIA tried to be covert, they failed because agent Allen Lawrence Pope was captured and identified as a part of the CIA; Sukarno used this to crush the operation. Later on, Allen Dulles had a new “mission” - overseeing the new CIA location in Langley, Virginia. The CIA underwent a new national security policy known as the “New Look,” including experimental drug testing on humans that observed the effects of LSD when administered to humans. Allen Dulles also wanted to protect his agency and did so by making a policy that “CIA officers would not be allowed to testify before Congress.”14 Unfortunately, another mission planned by Dulles, the invasion of  The Bay of Pigs in 1961, was an attempt to destroy the new communist government in Cuba that was exposed and turned into an embarrassment. President John F. Kennedy wanted a CIA director he could trust and so on Dulles’s 69th birthday, Dulles finally retired. Although his track record was far from flawless, Allen Dulles was an important CIA director who helped establish a base for covert operations and intelligence collection.

The birth of modern intelligence began with Allen Dulles and so he was a fundamental part of shaping Cold War policy. Grose shows how Dulles was manipulative and “knew exactly the impression he was making on a visitor,” which made him a great asset when collecting intelligence because he knew how to charm his way into getting the information he needed.15 He understood the importance of acquiring vital pieces of intelligence, even in times of peace because he believed that intelligence included strategic, military, and “scientific - in the field of atomic energy, guided missiles, supersonic aircraft and the like” concerns.16 Dulles advocated for the collection of intelligence on not only the Soviet Union, but also European, Asian, and South American countries. Although Dulles’s involvement in the Bay of Pigs essentially led to his resignation, he still was involved in other successful operations such as Operation Ajax.

Peter Grose has an extensive resume for he was a literary agent, editor of Foreign Affairs, publisher, journalist, foreign and diplomatic correspondent for the New York Times, and a part of the State Department’s planning staff under President Jimmy Carter;  these experiences are what enabled Grose to be able to successfully write his books. Through his journalistic career, Grose still has experience of living in a foreign country and acquiring information. Because of his stature, Grose had many resources when writing the book such as access to the “great presidential libraries of those chief executives whom Allen served,” and the staff at the “Council on Foreign Relations in New York”; this was similar to how Dulles was so successful when it came to starting an Intelligence agency, both had many years worth of contacts from all the networking they had done.17 Because Peter Grose is Australian, his heritage did not influence his point of view in this book as much as his career and experience; he was biased towards neither side of the Cold War’s opposing groups. Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles was published in 1994, just three years after the Cold War officially ended. Some general attitudes during this period were happiness and relief since the “war” was over and would dwindle.

Daniel Levine, a professor at Bowdoin College, wrote a review on Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles that discusses Peter Grose’s background saying that he “fits the subject” and “had available to him the usual archival sources and an internal history of the CIA.”18 Levine then praises Grose's book’s coverage of the topic by saying “the 1950’s were the heyday of CIA activity, and Grose dramatically covers the major stories.” Levine feels that Grose writes the biography and explains the details in an interesting manner.  However, he critiques Grose at the end by saying that  “the story could have profited more from [Grose’s] own thought.”19 Jacob Heilbrunn, a graduate associate at Harvard University, thought that Grose had done a “splendid job of presenting Dulles’s complicated life in a clear and coherent fashion.” However, he critiques Grose by saying that he’s “reticent in assessing Dulles’s career,” and instead “supplies the reader with minute details of [Dulles’s] personal life.”20 Overall, both Daniel Levine and Jacob Heilbrunn thought that Grose’s biography was informative but in some areas lacking important details, while writing too much about  Grose left out important details.

Peter Grose’s book, Gentleman Spy, was well-organized and it provided insight into not only Allen Dulles’s many occupations but also his personal life. However, it was too lengthy since half of the book takes place before the Cold War and Allen Dulles’s career at the Central Intelligence Agency. Although it was interesting to see the many occupations Dulles had, such as a diplomat and a lawyer and his roles in the First and Second World War, it was tedious reading information that was essentially irrelevant to Dulles’s position as head of the CIA. One advantage was that the language was not too complicated so it was easy to understand. The chapters on the 1950s and Allen Dulles’s role at the CIA were significantly more interesting especially since Grose covered some of the most dramatic events that happened during the 1950s. The way Grose writes about Dulles shows how much Dulles was involved in the government, especially the CIA, saying that “appointment as Chief of Central Intelligence should be somewhat comparable to appointment to high judicial office.”21Overall this comprehensive biography of Allen Dulles was interesting and is recommended to those wanting to learn more about the origins of the Central Intelligence Agency.

 The 1950s, in regards to the CIA, were a time of progress and liberalism because of the many developments in intelligence collection, covert operations, and military strategies that were going on during this decade. Because of the rising tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, American intelligence advanced significantly and led to the development of new technology such as the U-2 spy plane. Since the “vicious machinations of international communism” posed a threat that played on the fears of Americans, intelligence collection became more extensive with the implementation of NSC-68 in order to protect American citizens and countries that neighbored those that had already fallen to Communism.22 Peter Grose’s work supports this contention because he talks about how the government implemented many new policies and agencies in order to protect the Americans during the Cold War.

 Overall, Gentleman Spy:The Life of Allen Dulles by Peter Grose was an informative biography on the life of Allen Dulles, director of the CIA from 1953-1961. Even though this book talks about Dulles’s life before he became CIA director, some of the background coverage was pertinent to how he slowly climbed up the political ladder. Although “Allen never attained the prominence of his brother Foster,” he was still an important asset in shaping Cold War foreign policy and was involved in many operations during the “Dulles Era” at the Central Intelligence Agency.23

Footnotes:

1.Grose, Peter. Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles. New York. Houghton Mifflin Company.1994. 388

2.Grose, Peter. 31

3.Grose, Peter. 75

4.Grose, Peter. 88

5.Grose, Peter. 131

6.Grose, Peter. 192

7.Grose, Peter. 195

8.Grose, Peter. 273

9.Grose, Peter. 287

10.Grose, Peter. 291

11.Grose, Peter. 363

12.Grose, Peter. 345

13.Grose, Peter. 419

14.Grose, Peter. 452

15.Grose, Peter. 257

16.Grose, Peter. 273

17.Grose, Peter. 571

18. Levine, Daniel. "Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles." N.p., 23 Sept. 1995. Web.

19. Levine, Daniel. "Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles." N.p., 23 Sept. 1995. Web.

20. Heilbrunn, Jacob. "The Old Boy At War." The New Republic. N.p., 27 Mar. 1995. Web. 5 June 2014.

21.Grose, Peter.276

22.Grose, Peter. 363